The International Response to Conflict and Genocide:Lessons from the Rwanda Experience

Chapter 11

Cross-Cutting Issues and a Vision for the Future

Four critical issues of great relevance to the overall success of rehabilitation and reconstruction are reviewed in this chapter. Although these issues have been touched on in different sections of the report, they are discussed here to underscore their importance. Three are factors shaping the impact and effectiveness of international assistance. The fourth pertains to the long-term stability and prosperity of Rwanda. The international community and Rwanda itself face major policy choices in order to address these issues.

The consequences of the genocide

Post-genocide Rwanda is dramatically different from pre-genocide Rwanda. The systematic attempt on the part of some Hutu to exterminate the Tutsi group has transformed the social, political and economic landscape of Rwanda. The systematic killing of over half a million people has changed the demographic profile of the country, led to the migration of over two million people to neighboring states, and shattered Rwanda's social structure.1 It has also profoundly affected existing political and cultural institutions. But, above all, it has undermined the social trust that binds people together. Just as the Holocaust redefined the Jewish identity, so has the Rwanda genocide left a profound impact on the psyches of both Tutsi and Hutu.

The international community took steps to investigate the genocide and punish the instigators by establishing an international Tribunal; however, it has largely failed to incorporate the implications of genocide in the design and implementation of assistance programs in Rwanda. It has treated and continues to treat the present crisis like other civil wars in which the international community intervened and assisted the suffering population. Such an approach has distorted assistance priorities, undermined the effectiveness of the assistance programs and alienated the present government. For example, the international community has tended to overlook the plight of the survivors of the genocide. There are still few nationwide programs targeted to them, especially for the widows, rape victims or the bereaved families. By and large, the survivors have not been treated any differently from other segments of the population. On the other hand, the international community has spent immense resources on the refugees. It is not that the refugees do not deserve assistance but that such assistance should be balanced with assistance to survivors.

The international community's apparent lack of understanding of the psychological impact of genocide has also contributed to the distrust - and even open hostility - of the Rwandese government towards the UN human rights field operation.2 As mentioned earlier, a primary role of these field operation officers has been to hear complaints about human rights violations, investigate them, and forward their findings to the High Commissioner. Management and implementation problems have plagued the operation since its beginning. More importantly, its legitimacy has been vastly compromised because it is perceived as one-sided, focusing on current human rights violations instead of on crimes against humanity. Although the situation has slightly improved with the continuing reorientation of the field operation, much damage has already been done to its credibility and effectiveness.

Overall, limited mandates of the bilateral and multilateral agencies, the established modalities for allocating resources, and the procedures for delivering aid in the field are institutional factors that have led to the inability of the international community to respond adequately to the unique consequences of genocide. However, beyond institutional roadblocks, the cultural insensitivity of the international community at times devalued the tragic social and human dimensions of the genocide as perceived by Rwandese. Perhaps the most lamentable example has been the rush to promote reconciliation over the understandable resistance of those who had suffered immensely.

Relationship between NGOs and the government

Within weeks after the collapse of the previous regime, hundreds of NGOs came to Rwanda and its neighboring countries to deliver humanitarian assistance. Despite many shortcomings, these organizations have provided invaluable assistance in delivering and maintaining essential social services, caring for refugees and internally displaced persons and reaching out to vulnerable groups in the countryside. There were around 150 NGOs operating in Rwanda in December 1995 before the Rwandese government expelled or restricted the activity of approximately 56, leaving 102 NGOs operational within the country.3

While some tensions always existed between the government and NGOs, not surprisingly they became more visible and serious. During the acute crisis, NGOs enjoyed unprecedented freedom and access. They formulated their own strategies and activities based on their perceptions of the needs of beneficiaries and their capacities and mandates. The fragile government was hardly in a position to exercise any control. But as it began consolidating its position, it started asserting its authority over NGOs. It insisted that they work within the framework of its policies, priorities and procedures. The government now requires that they register with the Ministry of Rehabilitation and formulate their programs in consultation with the concerned ministries. While most NGOs have submitted their applications for registration and are working within the guidelines established by the government, many are still resisting the new requirements.4 In some cases this resistance has proven costly. In December, the government expelled 38 organizations that it said had failed to comply with the law and/or were considered to be ineffective.

The vast resources at the command of the NGO community are at the heart of the problem. NGOs, often funded by donor agencies, are able to design and implement their programs, while the government has little or no funds to pay salaries of its employees. On a more mundane plane, NGOs tend to enjoy excellent office and transport facilities. In contrast, many government officials are still struggling for basic furniture, telephones, typewriters and in many cases, even paper. Obviously, some resent the presence of NGOs. The situation has been further aggravated by two additional factors. First, many NGOs have inadvertently lured experienced staff from the government by offering higher salaries and fringe benefits, thereby further undermining institutional capabilities of line ministries. Unaware, some have even created parallel structures in the field. Second, because senior staff of NGOs have generally come from Europe and North America, a relatively large expatriate community has emerged in Kigali, whose affluent lifestyle arouses understandable envy among local elites.

There are some encouraging developments, however. In the case of some ministries such as Agriculture, a working partnership has emerged between the Ministry and concerned NGOs. Such partnership is also evolving in the case of Health and Education Ministries. Many NGOs are reducing their operations and expatriate staff, increasing training opportunities for indigenous staff and implementing capacity-building measures. It appears that established NGOs with professional staff are earnestly trying to adjust to the new realities. The government also seems more appreciative of the contributions of some NGOs and the leverage they have with donor agencies.

Unrealistic expectations for repatriation

The voluntary return of Rwandese refugees is viewed by the international community as a cornerstone for any durable solution to the present crisis. The presence of two million refugees on the borders indeed poses a serious security threat and undermines the economic and political stability of the country. It also constitutes a severe drain on humanitarian assistance, which the international community can ill afford in the present climate. Consequently, the international community is fully supportive of voluntary repatriation of refugees within the next year or two. As late as September 1995, under duress from the Zairian government, UNHCR promised to try to facilitate the repatriation of all refugees by the end of the year. Currently, only a few hundred refugees return to Rwanda by official channels each day. UNHCR's goal is to promote the return of 6,000 refugees per day: 3,000 from Zaire, 2,000 from Tanzania and 1,000 from Burundi.5 An agreement between regional heads of state at the Cairo Summit seeks to increase that number to 10,000 a day, which reflects frustration with the huge and politically volatile refugee population more than realism.

While the numbers sought by UNHCR and the Cairo Summit seem highly unrealistic, changes in the leadership structure in the camps and general improvements in security in Rwanda can accelerate the pace of repatriation. The camps need to be restructured to break the hold of the present leadership over the refugees, and prevent them from intimidating and punishing those who want to go back. Further, disinformation campaigns need to be countered. At the same time, the government needs to improve the human rights situation, ensure that the land and properties of the refugees be restored, and spell out its position on the degrees of culpability for genocide. Procedures for the arrest and prosecution of the participants need to be clarified. The international community by itself cannot institute these changes; it has to depend on the cooperation of the governments of Rwanda and its neighboring countries. As the matters stand, there is little room for optimism.

Even if the suggested changes occur, a substantial proportion of the refugee population is still unlikely to repatriate soon for three reasons. First, between 10 to 15 percent of the refugees in the camps (adult and adolescent) may have participated directly in mass killing.6 These refugees and their families would be understandably reluctant to return. Second, transmigration of people has been quite common in the Great Lakes region in the past. Many Kinyarwanda-speaking "ethnic Rwandese" live in Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi and Zaire. Consequently, refugees are not in totally foreign milieus; there are bonds of history and language that help mitigate refugees' nostalgia. Finally, the experience of past complex emergencies unmistakably shows that it usually takes years, even decades, before significant voluntary repatriation takes place. Even then, rather than going back to their country of origin, many refugees settle in host countries or move to third countries. It is, therefore, imperative that the international community demonstrate more realism in planning its initiatives for the refugees than it has done so far by considering a wider range of solutions to the crisis. It should prepare itself for the eventuality that a significant percentage of refugees might not return and would need assistance for resettlement in other countries.

Long-term development of Rwanda

The vast humanitarian assistance that has poured into Rwanda and neighboring countries has undoubtedly saved thousands of lives, provided essential services to millions of people and imparted some confidence in the future. However, humanitarian assistance alone cannot solve the present crisis; it has provided only a temporary "window of opportunity." At this juncture, the international community can continue to assist Rwanda and its neighbors in searching for a durable solution or waste its chance in the fond hope that the problem will somehow be solved without its critical support.

In examining the question of long-term development of Rwanda, two considerations should be kept in mind. First, the success of Rwanda's march towards a politically stable and economically sustainable society will depend upon a complex set of conditions and circumstances. For example, it will be shaped by its distinctive social, cultural and economic institutions, emerging regional alignments and interests, and the vision shown by its leadership. The international donor community can influence such factors, but cannot control them. Second, the transition process is not likely to be a smooth one. Rather, as has been the case with many complex emergencies, the process is most likely to be characterized by periods of ups and downs, stagnation, and even regression. There is a need to take a long-term perspective.

A broad consensus seems to be emerging that the country should give top priority to building an effective judicial system based on the rule of law; ensuring physical security to returning refugees and survivors of genocide; and promoting rapid economic growth in agriculture and small business sectors. In this regard, donors should avoid a "business as usual" approach to rehabilitation and reconstruction that uses past social and economic policies as models for Rwanda's future. Unlike the past, when the primary focus was on economic growth, the country will have to follow a strategy of integrated development that emphasizes human resources. The government will also have to face the problem of ethnicity and political participation, and encourage a culture of tolerance and respect for democratic principles and human rights.

However, it appears increasingly probable that efforts at the national level alone are not sufficient to solve the refugee return problem. Because of growing political and ethnic tensions in Burundi, the presence of two million Rwandese refugees in neighboring states, and the high population density of the country, a regional approach will be key to longer-term resolution of the crisis. Such an approach may require resettlement of populations, redrawing of national boundaries and/or greater regional political and economic integration. Whether Rwanda, its neighbors and the international community will take the bold steps necessary to achieve a durable regional solution to this complex problem is a question that history alone can answer.

Endnotes

1) There are now numerous articles on this subject. Probably, the most in-depth discussion is to be found in African Rights, Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance.

2) See African Rights, "A Waste of Hope: United Nations Human Rights Field Operation".

3) From WFP, "Emergency Report No. 50", December 15, 1995.

4) By April 1995, 88 had actually been registered.

5) From Catholic Relief Services, "Rwanda Emergency Situation Report No. 54," September 25, 1995.

6) These estimates are based on interviews with key informants. There are no hard data on the subject.

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