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Danish Transitional Assistance, Volume 1, Synthesis Report - 8. COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY REVIEW8. COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY REVIEW
8.1 Afghanistan
8.1.2 Economic and Social Setting
Afghanistan has an area of 645,500 km2, which in general is very mountainous. In 1993, the
population was estimated at 22.1 million.
In 1979, Afghanistan was invaded by the Soviet Union. After 10 years of occupation, the
Russians withdraw in February 1989. During the war against the Soviet Union the lives of almost
1 million people have been sacrificed. As a result of the war, Afghanistan is one of the poorest
countries in the world, with a GDP per capita in 1987 estimated at USD 130. Another
consequence of the war is the refugee situation. Of an estimated population of 16,7 million in
1988, one third fled to the neighbouring countries. The majority went to Pakistan and the
remainder to Iran. There are approximately two million internally displaced persons.
Since the end of the Russian invasion a civil war has continued to ravage the country. The civil
war is being fought between different clan leaders and against the administration in Kabul. For
the past years, the administration in Kabul cannot be characterized as a government in charge in a
normal sense. However, the fact remains that the Government directly controls a large part of the
country and is represented in the provincial capitals. The ruling of the country-side has for longer
periods been dominated by different local leaders. To a growing extent, the Government appears
to be taking over the leadership of the country.
The internal security situation has changed continuously as a consequence of the continuing
fighting. However, despite fighting and the presence of many landmines, 80-90 per cent of the
country remains relatively calm without major security risks.
8.1.3 Relevance of Transitional Assistance to Afghanistan
According to the Danida 5-Year Rolling Plans, Afghanistan has been applicable for transitional
assistance from 1990 through 1994. In this period both humanitarian and NGO assistance has
been approved and disbursed. According to the Danida country desk, these funds have not been
disbursed as normal transitional assistance. According to the same country desk, this has been
due to the simple fact, that since there is no country-wide government to negotiate a possible
support with, Danida can not enter the country. Nevertheless, according to information from the
Danish Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan, from where Danish assistance to Afghanistan is co-ordinated, part of the prior and on-going assistance to Afghanistan is regarded as transitional
assistance, and not only as humanitarian assistance.
One way of distinguishing between humanitarian and transitional assistance is through the
registration codes used in the Danida Financial Management System, FMS. According to the
FMS, part of the previous Danida assistance has been registered as humanitarian assistance and
part as bilateral assistance.
The part recorded as bilateral assistance could in principle be regarded as transitional assistance.
However, since Danish bilateral assistance to Afghanistan has only been provided through
NGOs, this could as well be considered NGO assistance to a Non-Programme Country. This is in
line with the fact that an NGO appropriation was ratified in November 1988, half a year before
transitional assistance was even defined as an aid form.
Taking into consideration that NGO assistance could also be allocated as transitional assistance,
it is found pertinent to define non-humanitarian NGO assistance to Afghanistan in the period
1990-94 as transitional assistance. Put in other words, the assistance registered as bilateral
assistance in the period 1990-94 is in the current evaluation interpreted as transitional assistance.
It should, however, be noted that the status of Afghanistan in the context of transitional
assistance has not been clearly defined within Danida.
The selection of Afghanistan as a transitional assistance country was closely linked to the peace
process, which began in early 1990. During this process, the international donor community was
called, in order to support the transition towards a stabilisation of the economic and social
development of the country.
8.1.4 Relevance of Sector and Project Selection
Following the Danish decision in 1990 of granting Afghanistan status as a transitional assistance
country, the means of intervention and the sectors to give priority were never defined in detail.
Before 1990, a few NGOs were working in and (especially) around Afghanistan, mainly in the
refugee camps. With the prospect of peace in Afghanistan the NGOs moved into the country,
planning that the resettlement process could be strengthened through social and civil
infrastructure rehabilitation at the village level.
In the period 1990-94 two Danish NGOs have received more than DKK 100 million for the
rehabilitation of Afghan villages with the purpose of preparing the resettlement of refugees. For
further details, reference is made to Annex 2. Although the indicative planning figure for
transitional assistance to Afghanistan has been maintained at DKK 50 million, DKK 109 million
had been disbursed by end 1994. For 1995, an additional DKK 26.5 million was granted to one
of the two NGOs (The Danish Committee for the Aid to Afghan Refugees - DACAAR),
previously supported through transitional assistance. However, this amount can no longer be
considered as transitional assistance, since Afghanistan no longer appears on the list of
transitional assistance countries. The same will be the case in the following years, where
DACAAR is expected to continue the activities in Afghanistan. The continuation of this NGO
project beyond the transitional assistance framework is an indication of a certain amount of
confusion that has surrounded the delivery of transitional assistance to Afghanistan.
Besides the bilateral assistance granted as transitional assistance, humanitarian assistance has
continuously been allocated to NGOs and through the United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan, UNOCHA. In 1989, Denmark pledged
DKK 60 million to UNOCHA. Later, additional funding has been earmarked to UNOCHA.
8.1.5 Conclusions and Recommendations
Despite the confusion as to whether the assistance to Afghanistan should be considered
transitional assistance or not, Afghanistan provides an illustrative case of the movement in the
grey zone between humanitarian and development assistance projects. Seen in the light of the
discussions above, Afghanistan is a good example of how it has been possible to move from
humanitarian assistance and into more sustainable improvements or projects.
Through the use of NGOs as implementing channels, Danida has managed to support Afghans
during the difficult resettlement process following a long period of displacement. This has been
done through fast disbursing projects and despite the inherent difficulties related to the security
situation. To the extent possible, local resources have been used in the form of manpower.
Concerning the financial management of transitional assistance to Afghanistan, it could be
questioned why an indicative planning figure of DKK 50 million has been maintained, while the
actual disbursements exceed DKK 100 million. Another preoccupation is the issue related to the
approval of additional funds (DKK 26 million) in 1995 for an NGO, despite the fact that
Afghanistan is no longer considered a transitional assistance country. On this background it does
not seem to logical to delete Afghanistan from the list of transitional assistance countries while
the same type of bilateral assistance as in previous years is continued.
The use of the concept of transitional assistance in the case of Afghanistan has not been applied
in a very coherent manner.
8.2 Albania
8.2.1 Economic and Social Setting
Albania has a land area of 29,000 km2 and a population of about 3.4 million people (1993). In
1990, Albania was the last country in Europe to abandon a totalitarian regime. The first
democratic elections were held in the spring of 1991. These were followed by a period of two
years with political instability. The last years have generally been stable and the economy has
expanded and at the same time been changed towards a market-orientation, despite the lack of
financial instruments for such conditions. Albania has an estimated GNP per capita of USD 340
(1993). Albania is generally considered the poorest country in Europe and has been classified
LDC by the UN.
In general, the social and economic conditions in Albania warrant the provision of transitional
assistance according to the criteria formulated in section 3. A decision to grant up to DKK 45
million to be disbursed over a three-year period, was approved by the Danish government in
1994. The major part of the allocation should be channelled through Danish NGOs. In addition,
DKK eight to nine million were earmarked for projects administered by Danida for promotion of
democracy and human rights.
8.2.2 Transitional Assistance to Albania
The decision to grant Albania transitional assistance was made contrary to the fact that Denmark
as a principle does not provide development aid to European countries even if they are formally
qualified, e.g. by being included in DAC's list of developing countries.
This condition, however, would not make Albania ineligible for humanitarian assistance or
support in case of natural or man-made disasters. Albania is also eligible for support from the
Democracy Fund and the funds for assistance to Central and Eastern Europe. Although Albania's
human rights record has improved considerably, especially during the recent years, the overall
human rights situation has been questioned. Also, the general situation at the Balkans and
Albania's strained relation to Greece over Macedonia put some constraints on the justification of
the assistance. The Danish business community also shown a limited interest in Albania, as
evidenced in failed attempts to organise trade delegations to the country.
The EC attempted several times to coordinate the initiation of a more significant assistance, and
Danish NGOs present in Albania were also active in the period following the change of the
political system.
Given the political situation at the Balkans it is unlikely that further Danish transitional
assistance will be granted in addition to the DKK 45 million. Assistance from the Democracy
Fund and the funds for assistance to Central and Eastern Europe may still be granted after the
termination of transitional assistance.
8.2.3 Sector and Project Selection
At a meeting between Danish NGOs and Danida in January 1994, it was agreed that the NGOs
would support projects within the health sector, the social sector and the education sector. It was
furthermore envisaged that projects would be implemented directly by Danida within promotion
of democracy and human rights.
The Danish NGOs could apply for grants in the Spring of 1994. In August 1994, the Board of
Danida approved ten NGO projects and one project implemented by Danida of a total value of
approximately DKK 27 million. This was approved by the Parliamentary Finance Committee in
November 1994. The total grant of DKK 45 million was not committed due to lack of qualified
applications.
A second package of NGO projects came up for approval by the Danida Board in Mid-June
1995. These projects are, like the projects approved in 1994, within the sectors of health,
education and democracy/human rights. Several of the projects recommended for approval in the
second round are a continuation of the projects from the first package. With the approval of the
second package, the entire indicative planning figure of DKK 45 million is committed.
8.2.4 Implementation of Interventions
The decision to grant DKK 45 million as transitional assistance to Albania included a decision to
leave most of the implementation with Danish NGOs. Following a meeting with Danish NGOs in
February 1994, Danida issued guidelines for the application for funds under the transitional
assistance to Albania.
Apart from a Danida implemented project on civil society development included in the first
package of projects and a project of support to the Albanian judicial system up for approval in
this last round, all projects are implemented by NGOs. Whilst very few of the traditional large
NGOs are undertaking projects in Albania, several of the NGOs present have undertaken
activities in the country even before the present grants from Danida. As most of the projects have
commenced implementation in 1995, it is too early to draw any conclusions on the effects of the
projects.
8.2.5 Conclusions
The implementation of Danish transitional assistance to Albania has been very well organised by
Danida. By deciding to let NGOs implement almost the entire transitional assistance, Danida has
been able to select the best project applications submitted by Danish NGOs. In this way, it has
been relatively easy to contain the programme within the prioritised sectors. The transitional
nature of the assistance has been emphasized to the NGOs, and the sustainability of the projects
has been a part of the selection criteria. At the same time, Danida has not engaged in far-reaching
projects which could have created false expectations or, in other ways, made it difficult for
Danida to terminate the programme in 1997.
8.3 Angola
8.3.1 Economic and Social Setting
Angola is, with 1,246,700 km2, the third largest country in Africa south of the Sahara. The total
population is approximately 10 million people although reliable figures are not available.
Approximately 30% of the population live in urban areas.
The Portuguese left Angola in 1974 and a new government was formed in 1975. A long internal
struggle for power followed and prospects for the restoration of peace were frustrated on many
occasions.
Angola has large areas of productive agricultural lands as well as over 30 different minerals,
apart from large oil reserves, which are capable of commercial exploitation. Besides oil, only
diamonds and iron are being extracted on a commercial basis at present.
The economy is strongly influenced by the many years of armed struggle. In 1989, the GDP per
capita was estimated at 610 USD. While the economy of Angola is dominated by oil
exploitation, this is still not enough to finance the large public sector and Angola has a chronic
budget deficit.
Only little information is available on socio-economic conditions in Angola but it is certain that
large enclaves of poverty stricken and internally displaced people exist.
8.3.2 Transitional Assistance to Angola
During the period 1975 to 1992, following independence, Danish aid to Angola was given in an
amount of DKK 284 million, 44 per cent of which were grants and the remaining were in the
form of two large government loans. The majority of aid to Angola has been bilateral (90%) and
has, in particular, supported cement production (DKK 170 million) and the fisheries sector (DKK
65 million).
The decision to include Angola as a country eligible for transitional assistance was taken in 1992.
The assistance programme was fixed to be in the order of DKK 200 million for the period 1992-96. The background for the decision was, in part, the earlier bilateral support combined with the
signing of the peace agreement between the MPLA Government and the rebel UNITA
organisation. In addition, it was being considered whether to include Angola as a programme
country. Transitional assistance to Angola can therefore be seen to reflect a wish, both to support
an internal transitional period following peace, but also as a transition to becoming a programme
country. Angola did not, in the end, become a programme country.
8.3.3 Sector and Project Selection
The areas for transitional aid were, based on a country report prepared in 1991, initially
determined to cover: rehabilitation of infrastructure; reintegration of demobilised soldiers and
internal refugees into the productive sectors; and support for analysing the rehabilitation needs
of Angola (Danida Rolling 5-year Plan 1992-96).
In the next Danida 5 year plan (1993-97) the areas for transitional assistance were expanded to
include democratisation, as some support had already been given to the elections in 1992.
However, as a result of the elections, the civil war broke out again and Danish aid has since then
been limited to a few projects, mainly a continuation of projects from before transitional
assistance, as well as support to the elections through UNDP. None of these projects are
considered part of the transitional assistance.
During the period 1992-95 transitional assistance was postponed annually due to the civil war. In
1994, a new peace agreement was signed and transitional assistance is now planned to start
during 1996 with the financial framework remaining at the original level of approximately DKK
200 million.
A fact finding mission was launched in the summer 1995 with the basic purpose to update
information needed for a detailed planning of the transitional assistance. On the basis of the
results of this mission and in cooperation with the Government of Angola, a country strategy was
designed. The country strategy covers the period 1996 - 2000 and focuses on the following
sectors: humanitarian assistance executed by Danish NGOs to clearing of landmines; repatriation
of soldiers and displaced persons; and rehabilitation of social infrastructure. Other rehabilitation
of infrastructure, most likely in the context of a World Bank programme. And assistance to
democracy and human rights. Finally, the repayment of the two state loans was cancelled.
8.3.4 Conclusions
Angola was, when the decision to grant transitional assistance in 1991 was made, a country
meeting the criteria for this aid type. The basis of this decision has not changed, and Angola still
fulfils the criteria.
8.4 Cambodia
8.4.1 Economic and Social Setting
Cambodia covers an area of 181,000 km2 and is populated by 9.6 million people (1993). In
October 1991, a political solution to the internal problems which had resulted in more than 20
years of unrest, was reached. This so-called Paris agreement concluded more than two years of
international efforts to reach an understanding between the parties, following the Vietnamese
withdrawal of troops from the country in 1989. Free elections were held in May 1993 following a
repatriation of more than 350,000 refugees from camps in Thailand.
Following these elections, a coalition was formed, which is still in power, under the
constitutional monarchy of King Sihanouk. The political situation has, since Khmer Rouge has
withdrawn from the peace process, not been stable, and violent confrontations still occur at the
Thai border.
Due to a rice harvest in 1994-95 well below target, the annual real growth in GDP only reached
approximately 5% in 1994, compared to government expectations of 7%. The agricultural sector
contributes an estimated 50% of a GNP/capita of approximately USD 200 (1991).
8.4.2 Transitional Assistance to Cambodia
Prior to the Vietnamese invasion in late 1978, Denmark's only development assistance to
Cambodia was a DKK 30 million loan. During the armed conflict in Cambodia, Danida
contributed to UN funds for Cambodian refugees, especially through United Nations Border
Relief Operation (UNBRO). The reconsidering of Danish assistance to Cambodia was linked to
the assessment of the general political situation in Indochina. With the withdrawal of Vietnamese
troops in 1989 Cambodia became eligible for Danish assistance. Several Danish NGOs appealed
to Danida for re-initiation of Danish bilateral assistance to Cambodia, and the first NGO-project
was approved in December 1990. Several humanitarian projects implemented by Danish NGOs
and by multilateral agencies followed. At this time it was not clear what form the future
assistance should take.
The political situation in Cambodia and the limited Danish assistance before the war, may have
been the reasons for not considering Cambodia as a programme country. The political situation in
Cambodia, especially prior to the signing of the Paris agreement, furthermore excluded
government to government assistance. The development efforts in Cambodia more or less had to
be launched from scratch. The need was urgent which made humanitarian assistance relevant.
After the signing of the Paris agreement in October 1991, the UN initiated the immense task of
resettling more than 350,000 refugees through the United Nations Transitional Authority in
Cambodia (UNTAC). In March 1992, it was decided to contribute funds (maximum amount of
DKK 80 million) to UNTAC. These funds were financed as humanitarian assistance.
The decision to include Cambodia as recipient of Danish transitional assistance was taken in
April 1992. The decision reflected the increasing pressure on Danida to support the rehabilitation
and the repatriation process. This pressure came from UN organisations and Danish NGOs. In
this way, the important Danish contributions to the repatriation process became more visible. In
April 1992 it was decided to grant an annual amount of DKK 75 million for the 3-year period
1992-94. It was envisaged that most of the funds would be disbursed for humanitarian purposes.
The channels through which the assistance were to be implemented were specified as the UN,
NGOs and the Mekong Committee. All future assistance, except contributions to UNTAC, were
to be covered by this frame. The initiation of a transitional assistance programme furthermore
made it possible to gradually shift the emphasis from humanitarian assistance to longer lasting
development efforts.
As indicated in annex 2 the total amount granted from 1992-95 was only DKK 128 million,
which means that the annual amount pledged of DKK 75 million/year for 1992-94 was not met.
It should furthermore be noted that the decision to grant transitional assistance had a
retrospective effect in as much as the projects granted 1990-91 -- totalling DKK 10.8 million --
were included as transitional assistance. During 1992-94 a substantial part of the Danish
transitional assistance (65%) was granted as humanitarian assistance. In 1993, it was decided to
continue Danida transitional assistance through 1995-97 based on the continued need for
assistance to the rehabilitation process. Due to the decreased need of humanitarian assistance, it
was decided to pledge a maximum of DKK 40 million annually for 1995-97. The implementing
channels were still to be multilateral agencies, NGOs and the Mekong Committee.
The indicative planning figure for Danish transitional assistance to Cambodia thus amounts to
DKK 75 million/year for 1992-94 and DKK 40 million/year for 1995-97 or a total of DKK 345
million. The pledge for 1997 has not been made which means that the total amount pledged on
donor conferences is now approximately DKK 306 million (USD 49 million) of which
approximately DKK 257 million is committed through approved projects, and approximately
DKK 131 million disbursed.
8.4.3 Sector and Project Selection
The first decision to grant transitional assistance in April 1992 did not include a specification of
the sectors involved, but the channels through which the assistance was to be directed were
specified as the Mekong Committee, NGOs and the UN. As mentioned above, it was expected
that a large part of the budget would be directed to humanitarian assistance.
In connection with the decision of September 1993 of continued transitional assistance to
Cambodia for 1995-97, the sectors of assistance were specified. The assistance was envisaged to
be concentrated to fishery/water environment and transport /infrastructure through the Mekong
Committee and the UN. The NGOs were expected to continue their support within health, rural
development and rehabilitation activities. It was furthermore foreseen that the democratisation
process might be supported on a bilateral basis.
It should be noted that the definition of sectors for each implementing channel (Mekong
Committee, UN, NGOs and bilateral) reflects the pattern of assistance up to that time. This
includes the bilateral assistance to the democratisation process where the Danish Embassy in
Bangkok (accredited to Cambodia) supported courses for Cambodian journalists.
Transitional assistance since 1993 has in general continued within these sectors. The support to
two research projects in Cambodia through the United Nations Research Institute for Social
Development (UNRISD) may, however, be regarded as outside the defined sectors.
Within five of the major concerns of Danish assistance -- poverty alleviation, gender,
environment, democracy and the Danish resource base -- the transitional assistance programme
to Cambodia has had varied effects. The first priority for the assistance to Cambodia seems to
have been to deliver humanitarian assistance and ease the resettlement of dispossessed refugees,
through income-generating activities.
The gender aspect does not seem to have attracted much special consideration in the planning of
the programme. A few of the NGO projects have, however, included particular concern towards
gender issues, although women have not been chosen as the main target group in any project.
Environmental considerations have, in general, been included in the projects. Especially the
longer reaching development assistance through the Mekong Committee has been concerned
with environmental issues. NGO projects in the agricultural sector have also considered the
environmental aspects, whereas environment is not an explicit concern when it comes to
humanitarian assistance. No evidence of environmental screenings during project preparation
following the Danida Environmental Guidelines has been found.
Direct strengthening of the fragile Cambodian democracy has only been the objective of a few projects. It may be argued, however, that the entire effort to rehabilitate the country has had an intrinsic objective to support the democratization process. Danish companies have only to a limited degree been involved in the implementation of the
assistance. Exceptions from this are the projects through the Mekong Committee, two ADB trust
fund projects(1), and contracts obtained by Danish companies regarding supply of products to the
UN funded by Danida.
The transitional assistance to Cambodia has, in general terms, fulfilled the criteria for Danish
transitional assistance in regards to the implementation channels, namely multilateral agencies,
NGOs and only direct bilateral assistance regarding support to democratisation. Direct
commodity supply has not been used.
8.4.4 Implementation of Interventions
The total number of grants to projects under the transitional assistance to Cambodia is 54. This
includes 22 grants to humanitarian assistance (excluding UNTAC) of which 14 have been
implemented by NGOs and eight by multilateral agencies.
Table 8.1: Implementation of Transitional Assistance to Cambodia
1 Includes clearing of arrears to the IMF and materials for three short-term consultants. The total amount committed is DKK 257,211,000. The table above indicates the distribution
amongst implementing agencies and Danida sections.
As the table indicates, as many as seven sections in Danida have been granting funds as
transitional assistance in the period 1992-95. This is mainly due to the decision from the very
beginning of transitional assistance that all assistance to Cambodia should be included. The
projects have, generally, involved little administration on behalf of Danida, and the role of the
Danida desk officers have more or less been reduced to disbursement and monitoring. This is
mainly due to the fact that most projects have been implemented by the Mekong Committee,
NGOs and the UN. The minimal administrative burden is regarded as one of the advantages of
transitional assistance.
The Mekong Committee has been an increasingly important implementing channel for the
Danish transitional assistance to Cambodia. Projects through the Mekong Committee may be
carried on under the allocation for regional assistance to Indochina after the end of the
transitional assistance period. In the same way, NGO projects under transitional assistance may
be continued after the termination of the programme. These projects may then be financed as
NGO assistance. The planned continuation of projects beyond the transitional assistance period
indicates that the projects are not expected to be sustainable within a limited time-frame, which
would otherwise be demanded for transitional assistance projects.
8.4.5 Conclusions
In terms of the general objectives of transitional assistance, Cambodia was definitely eligible for
transitional assistance. A massive effort was needed from the international donor community. In
addition, the UN and, to some extent, NGOs were in the country and were able to offer a
coordinated, timely and effective response to the urgent needs in regards to repatriation and
rehabilitation.
These efforts were labelled 'transitional assistance' for at least three reasons: firstly, Danida did
not want to be committed to long-term development assistance in Cambodia. Secondly, since
Danida wanted to support the repatriation process with a considerable amount, it was more
practical to pledge this amount on the donor conferences by defining a frame, than to merely
respond to requests. And thirdly, by launching the transitional assistance, it furthermore became
possible to extend the assistance beyond humanitarian aid.
The projects under transitional assistance have, however, only to a limited degree been
coordinated to produce a coherent programme. The planning has been reactive rather than
proactive. While this has increased the flexibility of the programme, it has also made it difficult
to obtain the advantages which may come from projects supporting each other.
It may also be noted that several NGO-projects and projects implemented through the Mekong
Committee are envisaged to last longer than is normally expected for transitional assistance. This
does not seem to present any particular problem since the continuation should be secured through
the integration in the Committee's programme.
By implementing the transitional programme through the Mekong Committee, NGOs and the
UN, Danida has minimized its administration burden, making it easier to withdraw from the
country. The possible disadvantage is the limited control, which makes it more difficult for
Danida to promote the specific objectives of Danish assistance, i.e. poverty alleviation and cross-cutting issues. Projects through the Mekong Committee and the NGO projects are not envisioned
to be reduced or terminated by 1998, like planned for other transitional assistance.
8.5 Chile
8.5.1 Economic and Social Setting
Chile covers an area of 757,000 km2. The country has a population of approximately 14 million,
of which more than 80% live in urban areas. The capital, Santiago de Chile, has a population of
about 4.5 million, almost half of whom live in slum areas. During the years of dictatorship, 1973-90, an estimated 150,000 people fled the country for political reasons.
On 5 October 1988, the people of Chile voted in a referendum against the continuation of the
ruling General Pinochet. Following this, general elections for the presidency and the parliament
were held in 1989. A new government took over in March 1990, ending 16 years of dictatorship.
In 1990, there were great expectations to the new government. However, financial means were
limited, especially because the new government inherited the fiscal budget from the former
government. Although there was a generally positive economic development at the national level,
with for instance 9% real growth in 1989, there was limited social equivalence. In order not to
interfere with macro indicators, like inflation, the best way to support social development was
found to be through foreign assistance and increased tax revenues. However, due to limited
political manoeuvring for the new government, tax revenues could only grow slowly.
The per capita GNP is approximately USD 3,000 (1993).
8.5.2 Transitional Assistance to Chile
Donor relations with Chile were initiated at the end of the 1960s. They were abruptly ended with
the military coup in September 1973. At that time vocational training and the dairy sector,
amongst others, were supported by Denmark.
During the 1980s Danish assistance was channelled to Chile through various NGOs. Due to the
per capita GDP limits determined for Danida assistance, bilateral assistance to Chile could not be
considered. However, NGO and multi-bi support could still be allocated.
In the beginning of 1990, Danida decided that the guidelines for transitional assistance could be
interpreted in a broad sense, whereby transitional assistance could be granted independently of
the general rules regulating Danida aid. Hereby the normally applied per capita GDP limits could
be neglected. It was concluded, however, that ample political support should be secured in case
Denmark should enter into an agreement with Chile on future assistance.
In February 1990, two Members of the Danish Parliament proposed to the Minister of Foreign
Affairs to consider support to the transition towards democracy in Chile. The following month,
March 1990, the Danish embassy in Chile was reporting on the planned assistance to Chile from
other E.U. and Nordic countries. The Embassy furthermore inquired about the possibilities for
future Danish assistance to Chile.
In March 1990 the Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs announced that Denmark had decided to
provide DKK 50 million in transitional assistance to Chile. Although this provision was not
mentioned in the Danida 5-Year Rolling Plan for the period 1990-95, transitional assistance to
Chile is considered to have been initiated in 1990, when this decision was taken.
8.5.3 Sector and Project Selection
As a result of an identification mission, a Letter of Intent was signed between the two
governments on 2 April 1990. In the letter it is expressed that the transitional assistance should
be earmarked as fast disbursing aid to support the social sector, where acute need for additional
financing had been identified. Danish assistance should also promote the transition towards
democracy. The Chilean authorities should elaborate a detailed project description document.
Based on the Chilean input, the Danish transitional assistance programme to Chile would include
the following components:
An emergency education programme for primary and secondary schools, assisting 900 selected
schools, or 200,000 pupils (DKK 28 million). The emergency programme is also supported by
Sweden with USD 6.9 million.
Housing programme for poor people, providing new houses and improvement of slum
dwellings (DKK 12 million). The Danish support was regarded as seed-money. Other donors
were providing a total of USD 85.8 million to the same programme.
Programmes for women, youth and reintegration of returning Chileans (DKK 10 million).
Danish assistance should be directed towards the creation of three regional centres for the formation and information of women (DKK 3.2 million). Another DKK 3.2 million will be provided to
"Youth and Its Rights", where the Danida assistance would be spent on 13 youth houses. The
Youth Programme has also received funds from other donors. The final DKK 3.6 million would
be channelled to the reintegration of returned Chileans.
A major risk during the implementation of the above activities, was that the Government might
have been unable to get sufficient funds from other sources to the same programmes, which
meant that the activities could not have been completed as envisaged. However, in addition to the
Danish contribution, Chile was promised USD 90 million in grants and USD 60 million in loans
from the international community in 1989.
In May 1990 the two year programme was approved by Denmark and an agreement was signed
between the two governments in October the same year.
In the documentation reviewed, it is stated that transitional assistance could only be used for
social projects, and it should not be expected, that Danish support would continue beyond the
two years. Contrary to this, an additional grant of DKK 13 million was approved in December
1992 for the Emergency Education Programme.
This decision was based on the recommendations of two Danida Review Missions, undertaken in
August 1991 and September 1992, respectively. The additional funding should cover a bridging
period until 1993, when a World Bank loan would take over the financing.
The funds transferred from Danida to Chile were deposited in a bank in Chile, pending their
disbursement. The accumulated interests earned during this period were, in agreement with
Danida, spent on a south-south programme, through which Chile investigated the possibilities of
providing development assistance to other countries in Latin America, which included Bolivia
and Nicaragua.
In addition to the DKK 50 million as transitional assistance, the Danida 5-Year Rolling Plan of
1991 (1991-95) included an indicative figure of DKK 30 million, that had been approved for
disbursement during 1991 for NGO activities. However, in the Danida files, no evidence has
been found related to how this provision should be managed and/or channelled to Chile. It is
therefore difficult to relate the NGO activities supported by Danida in Chile directly to
transitional assistance. In addition to the approved transitional assistance package, approximately
DKK 40 million was allocated to NGO projects during the period 1990-95 (see Annex 2). The
sectors supported through NGOs are in general within the social field.
Although any clear linkage between NGO and transitional assistance is difficult to identify, all
assistance channelled through NGOs in the period 1990-95 is for the purpose of the present
evaluation considered to be transitional assistance. This is found to be reasonable since both
kinds of assistance form part of Danida's bilateral assistance. Another reason is the fact that the
additional funding to the Emergency Education Programme was not mentioned in the Danida 5-Year Rolling Plans as transitional assistance. However, since this was an extension of the
original transitional assistance it must still be regarded as such. Finally, since these funds were
disbursed during 1993, the period of providing transitional assistance to Chile should at least be
considered as being from 1990 through 1993, although this was never officially defined.
It was stated in 1992 that Danida transitional assistance would be phased out during 1993. This
would include the support provided through Danish NGOs, unless support was given to extreme
pockets of poverty in rural areas, where NGOs could continue to support. However, in 1992 the
Danish NGO Ibis applied for founding for two projects, which were not directed to poverty
pockets, and they were approved.
8.5.4 Implementation of Interventions
Since there was no shortage of qualified personnel in Chile Danida would not be directly
involved in the execution of the programme. The implementation responsibility was taken care of
by the Ministry for Planning and Cooperation, where the Agency for International Co-operation
was responsible for progress, financial and final reporting.
8.5.5 Results of country evaluation
A selection of transitional assistance projects in Chile was visited in the field in the context of the
present evaluation. The findings of the evaluation team are presented in volume two to this
report.
The programme was considered overall successful and a valuable and timely support to Chile's
transition to democracy. Eight out of ten visited projects were found to have a relationship to the
promotion of democracy, human rights and good governance. Three of the projects were directly
focused on women's empowerment and promotion of their social and economic possibilities.
Two other projects supported female teachers, students and heads of household. Most projects
were oriented towards poverty alleviation whereas concern for the environment was a less
prominent feature.
The programme did not involve procurement of Danish goods; several of those interviewed
expressed satisfaction with the flexibility resulting from the aid not being tied. Contacts between
IFU and the Chilean Promotion Corporation had not materialised into any concrete projects.
The time frame was found to be adequate in five of the ten projects whereas the other five
projects with long-term objectives could have benefitted from assistance being extended for
another one or two years. Four of the projects are assessed to be highly sustainable due to an
efficient transfer to capable counterpart organisations. Two projects have serious difficulties with
regard to sustainability, in one case due to weakness of local counterparts, and in the other to the
lack of resources allocated from the state. In the remaining four projects the picture is more
mixed.
8.5.6 Conclusions and Recommendations
The provision of transitional assistance to Chile was a way to strengthen and consolidate the
democratic development, and secure its success. The transitional assistance was channelled in an
innovative and efficient way and in most cases reached its targets and beneficiaries.
The NGOs working in Chile were not initially part of transitional assistance since they had been
working there for several years before the country was granted status as transitional assistance
country. However, the fact that Chile was declared a transitional assistance country facilitated the
continuation of the NGO projects. Otherwise these may have been stopped earlier, due to the
relatively high level of GDP per capita.
Transitional assistance to Chile is found to meet the requirements for transitional assistance. This
achievement is closely related to the high institutional and human capacity within the country.
The success of the intervention in Chile, and the lessons learned, could advantageously be used
in other countries.
8.6. Ethiopia
8.6.1 Economic and Social Setting
Ethiopia has an area of 1,222,000 km2 and a population of 53.3 million people (1993).
Ethiopia has, as one of the few countries in Africa, never been colonised although several
attempts were made. The history of the country is fraught with conflict and armed struggle. This
was thought to have come to an end with the overthrow of President Mengistu in 1991 and the
creation of the Eritrean state. However, civil strife continued to make life difficult in some
regions.
In 1990 and 1991 GNP per capita was USD 120 placing Ethiopia almost as the poorest country in
the world. In 1992 and 1993 GNP per capita was lowered to USD 110 and USD 100,
respectively.
The population of Ethiopia is estimated at 50 million, the majority living in the highlands 1500 m
above sea level. This is also where the agricultural lands are found, due to the relative high
rainfall (over 800 mm. per year).
During the years of the Mengistu regime, Ethiopia received less foreign aid per capita than most
other development countries. This situation has since improved.
Agriculture remains the most important economic activity in Ethiopia contributing approximately
40% of the GNP.
8.6.2 Transitional Assistance to Ethiopia
Danish aid to Ethiopia during the period 1966-91 amounted to DKK 492 million. The majority
(DKK 260 million) was in the form of humanitarian aid. Most of the Danish aid has been
channelled through multi-bi projects and only 20% directly through NGOs, mainly
DanChurchAid and the Danish Red Cross.
Transitional assistance was decided upon after the overthrow of Mengistu and return to more
democratic conditions in 1991. The country was ravaged by the many years of war and economic
conditions were extremely bleak. Transitional assistance became official in October 1992 with
the approval of DKK 80 million in support for commodity assistance. It was stressed that
concentration should be on delivery of Danish commodities.
Later on, in 1993, Ethiopia was included as a Danida programme country. This status was later
revoked after disagreements between the two governments.
8.6.3 Sector and Project Selection
Transitional assistance to Ethiopia was given through one project in support of the "Emergency
Recovery and Reconstruction Programme" (ERRP), which was financed through the World
Bank. The main part of the Danish assistance was in the form of commodity aid for cement
factories and a soap factory.
Using transitional assistance for commodity support ensured a fast response to the needs of the
Government of Ethiopia. Channelling the funds through World Bank project ensured that
international coordination and cooperation would take place.
However, by using the World Bank as a channel, the option of taking any direct action to ensure
the inclusion the fundamental principles of Danish assistance, poverty orientation, and the cross-cutting themes, had to be foregone.
8.6.4 Implementation of Interventions
The project is a component of a World Bank Project for which an agreement was reached
between the Bank and the Government of Ethiopia in February 1992. Danish involvement in the
project came later in 1992 as it took some time to identify suitable Danish goods which could be
delivered under the ERRP. In total, DKK nine million was channelled through the World Bank,
with the remaining DKK 70 million as commodity support through Danish companies.
A review, undertaken in 1993, concluded that the overall World Bank project was a success and
that the Danish contribution had been well spent. The review report recommended additionally
that a further DKK 40 million be pledged through the ERRP. To date, this proposal has not been
agreed to by the Danish Authorities.
At present, Denmark is supporting a number of multi-bi projects in Ethiopia, which are not
regarded as part of transitional assistance. Singling out one project for transitional assistance may
be seen as an uncoordinated effort and it is not clear whether there was coherence with the ERRP
project and the other projects supported by Denmark.
8.6.5 Conclusions
Commodity support, as the case of Ethiopia, fulfils the two important objectives of transitional
assistance: it is direct, swift and time restricted. Furthermore, it supports the productive capacity,
otherwise lying idle or being under-utilized, and which the Government wants to give priority.
However, limiting transitional assistance to commodity support through a WB trust fund may
have confined the political influence and visibility. Poverty orientation and the three cross-cutting themes of Danish assistance could not be actively pursued. By focusing on one single and
huge project, not all aspects of Danish aid policy can be covered.
8.7 Gaza and the West Bank
8.7.1 Economic and Social Setting
Gaza and the West Bank are inhabited by approximately two million people with an estimated
average GDP per capita of USD 1,700 (1991). On September 13, 1993 Israel and the PLO signed
the principal agreement on Palestinian authority in the Occupied Territories. The agreement was
followed by the Cairo agreement in May 1994, which defines the Palestinian Self Rule.
The Palestinian authority is now in the process of establishing administrative institutions and a
system of tax collection. The political situation has not yet stabilised since the peace process has
suffered drawbacks after the assassination of Yitzak Rabin and the entry of a Likud-led
government. This transitional period has therefore been dominated by political considerations
both from donors and from the Palestinian authority. The development assistance has, on the
Palestinian side, been coordinated by the Palestinian Economic Council for Development and
Reconstruction (PECDAR). Apart from the leadership of the PLO, the chairman of PECDAR has
been the only person who has been entitled to make agreements concerning development
assistance to the areas.
8.7.2 Transitional Assistance to Gaza and the West Bank
The Danish pledge of DKK 250 million over 2-4 years was given immediately after the signing
of the agreement in September 1993. The assistance was pledged with a view to strengthening
the peace process in the area, and it was accompanied by pledges of a great number of donors.
During the donor conference on October 1, 1993 in Washington, pledges totalling approximately
USD one billion over the first two years were announced for Gaza and the West Bank. The donor
conference was attended by two Danish government ministers, as an indication of the high
priority given to the transitional assistance programme in Gaza and the West Bank.
The Danish pledge was envisaged to be disbursed through channels already in place, such as the
UN, the World Bank and Danish NGOs. Few Danish NGOs were, however, operational in the
two areas. Other considerations regarding the Danish assistance included the desire of prompt
implementation, use of the Danish resource base and the need to concentrate on few
implementing channels. The considerable task of coordinating the international assistance was
given to an ad-hoc liaison committee representing major donors with a secretariat in the World
Bank.
8.7.3 Relevance of Sector and Project Selection
Initially, no sectors were defined in the Danish pledge of DKK 250 million. It was, however,
foreseen that the grant should be used primarily for the rehabilitation of social and physical
infrastructure through UN organisations, the World Bank and Danish NGOs. In December 1993,
it was decided to allocate DKK 120 million through the World Bank Emergency Rehabilitation
Project, which will be used for projects within the sectors of road rehabilitation and water supply.
This decision was based on the need to strengthen the World Bank as the main implementing
agency in order to coordinate donor inputs, and the limited Danish administration needed for
such an allocation. Fifty percent of the Danish grant to the World Bank Emergency
Rehabilitation Project is tied to Danish supplies/consultancies.
DKK 23 million of Danish assistance has been granted to the Gaza Hospital administered by the
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).
UNRWA has received considerable Danish support, even before the transitional assistance
programme. Funds for UNRWA, which operates in the entire Middle East region, amounted to
DKK 55 million disbursed in 1994 and is expected to be increased to DKK 65 million in 1995
including the transitional assistance.
Other large grants include DKK 13 million for recurrent costs of the Palestinian authority, DKK
11 million for support to NGOs through DanChurchAid, DKK 7 million for support to the
Environmental Planning Directorate of the West Bank and DKK 32 million allocated for a
fisheries project in Gaza. All grants under the transitional assistance have been planned in very
close cooperation with the Palestinian authorities, who have had a significant influence on the
choice of projects.
The sectors supported by Danida have, to a considerable degree, followed the recommendations
made by the major donors, including the World Bank. Gender aspects and considerations
regarding poverty alleviation played a secondary role within the overall set of priorities regarding
implementation, whereas the Danish resource base was considered by assuring that 50% of grants
channelled through the World Bank are used for Danish supplies or consulting services. The
transitional development programme includes environmental projects and democracy projects.
The democracy projects have included seminars for journalists, support to NGOs and trade
unions and a project aiming at establishing a radio broadcast unit in Ramallah. Commodity
assistance has only been granted as part of TA projects, but assistance to recurrent costs of the
Palestine authority has been granted upon request from the ad-hoc liaison committee. This is
linked with the fact that the Palestinian authority has not yet established a tax system.
Given the current social problems in Gaza and the West Bank, it is noticeable that very few
projects have had poverty alleviation as a primary objective, although some projects may have
had poverty alleviating side-effects. Projects have, to a higher degree, tended to focus directly on
the political level of the peace process.
The Danish grant of DKK 250 million was fully committed by July 1994, indicating the high
interest in the programme on the receiving side.
The only activities financed outside the transitional assistance programme were the fixed annual
contribution to UNRWA and the Danish participation in the international police force in Hebron
in May 1994. Both of these contributions were financed as humanitarian assistance.
8.7.4 Implementation of Interventions
The total number of grants to projects under the transitional assistance to Gaza and the West
Bank, including projects under preparation, is 25. Five projects, totalling DKK 169 million
(68%), have been channelled through multilateral agencies, and the remaining 20 projects have
been implemented by NGOs or other organisations. Even though Danida did not envisage
engaging in direct bilateral projects, several projects are in fact bilateral. This has demanded a
greater involvement by Danida, especially for the two projects under preparation regarding
fisheries and environment.
The development towards more bilateral projects may be explained by pressure from the
Palestinian side to engage in bilateral activities, and an aspiration from the Danish resource base
to be involved in the programme.
Only in two projects has the preparation followed Danida guidelines for project preparation. This
is partly due to the special character of most of the projects of which six projects are below DKK
one million and five projects have been channelled through multilateral organisations. Seven projects, which have the size and the nature which normally would require it, do not have project
documents. Of these, six are NGO projects. The deviation from normal procedures indicates the
haste of the programme implementation.
Almost the entire transitional assistance programme has been monitored from the country desk in
Danida (S.5). The grant to the Gaza Hospital through UNRWA is, however, administered by the
office for humanitarian assistance (S.3) as it was initiated before the start of the transitional
assistance programme. The Danish pledge of DKK 250 million was committed in less than a
year, but the implementation of, especially, the multi-bi projects is lagging behind. This is due to
a number of factors, including the absorbtion capacity in relation to the number of donors, the
size of the international assistance, problems of coordination between donors and the
administrative capacities of the new Palestinian administration. In February 1995, Denmark
opened a representation office in Jericho. This should enhance the possibility of donor
coordination and project monitoring. If the representation office in Jericho is given local grant
authority the assistance programme could be extended beyond the DKK 250 million.
8.7.5 Conclusions
The commitment to Danish transitional assistance programme to Gaza and the West Bank came
rapidly. The implementation of the programme has been less swift, mainly due to absorption and
administration problems on the Palestinian side. The political circumstances of the programme
initiation made a quick response vital. Danida managed to do this, but the lack of an initial
strategy made Danida vulnerable to outside pressure regarding choice of projects and
implementation channels.
Any extension of the programme is linked to the political developments in the area and is
probably not relevant before the implementation of the present programme is further advanced. If
a continuation of the programme would be considered at a later stage, it is recommended to
define the sectors and implementation channels more precisely in advance, as has been done in
some other transitional assistance countries. Future implementation channels which seem most
relevant are the Danish NGOs present in the area and a continuation of the programmes through
the multilateral agencies.
There is little doubt that Gaza and the West Bank can benefit from development assistance. The
relatively high education level of the Palestinians, as well as the economic profile of the Middle
East countries, make it a plausible proposition that the development assistance need only be of a
transitional nature, provided the peace process is successful. It is therefore relevant to grant
transitional assistance to Gaza and the West Bank. However, considering the number of donors
and large total pledges (approximately USD 500 per capita over the first two years), the visibility
of the Danish contribution may be limited in the context.
8.8 Kyrghyzstan
8.8.1 Economic and Social Setting
In 1993, Kyrghyzstan had a population of 4.5 million on an area of 199,000 km2.
The economic and political ties of the Republic of Kyrghyzstan with the Republics of the former
Soviet Union used to be very strong: only 2% of the export from Kyrghyzstan went to other parts
of the world. Before its independence, Kyrghyzstan was one of the poorest republics of the
Union, and it is considered to be a low income country.
The breakup of the Soviet Union, and the following economic and social deterioration has
affected Kyrghyzstan dramatically. The supply of commodities is, in general, critical, and this is
especially felt in the social sectors where medicine and school equipment is in short supply.
Following independence in 1991, the political and economic system in Kyrghyzstan is being
changed towards a market oriented economy. To a growing extent, prices are determined through
market forces, and a limited number of enterprises have been privatized. At the same time,
democratic reforms have been initiated.
For 1993 the World Bank estimated, that Kyrghyzstan had a GDP of USD 830 per capita. During
the past two years, GDP may have decreased by 40 per cent. In 1992, industrial production went
down by 30 per cent, and in 1993 this decline continued. The same has been the case with the
real income level.
8.8.2 Transitional Assistance to Kyrghyzstan
In January 1993, five CIS-countries, located in Cental Asia, were included in the OECD DAC-list of developing countries. Upon this inclusion, Danida considered to assist one of the countries
through transitional assistance.
On 25 May 1993, a World Bank Consultative Group meeting was held in Bishkek, the capital of
Kyrghyzstan. During the meeting, the Government of Kyrghyzstan presented their most urgent
needs to the donor community. Based on these consultations, Danida decided, in cooperation
with other donors, to look further into the possibility of supporting Kyrghyzstan.
Apart from Denmark, some major donors are Germany and the Netherlands who support
Kyrghyzstan directly. The United Kingdom transmits their assistance through the World Bank
and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
Following the World Bank meeting, the Danish Minister for Development Cooperation visited
Kyrghyzstan in May 1993. In October 1993 a Danida Project Identification Mission was
undertaken in Kyrghyzstan. The Mission produced a comprehensive document.
Transitional assistance to Kyrghyzstan was approved in November 1993 by the Danida Board,
and in December by the Parliamentary Appropriations Committee. A framework amount of DKK
60 million was approved as a financial framework to be disbursed during three to four years
(1993-96).
On 9 February 1994, an agreement and a project document was signed between the two
governments.
In October 1994, Danida decided to extend the transitional assistance period with one year to
1997. The approved budgetary framework remained unchanged.
8.8.3 Sector and Project Selection
During the Project Identification Mission, four sectors were identified. Under each sector, a
number of interventions were defined, which included both commodity and technical assistance.
The sectors included agriculture, health, education and democratic reforms.
Agriculture: Since the mid-1980s the production of sugar had declined to almost zero, due to a
virus disease. To import new strains of sugar beets, the local plant genetic institute had contacted
companies in both Germany and Denmark (Maribo Seed). In 1978 Maribo Seed delivered a
treatment plant for sugar beets. Apart from this, procurement of spare parts for an existing plant
is planned.
Health: This component includes both commodity assistance and technical assistance. A number
of the elements were not defined in detail during the Identification Mission. This has been done
afterwards during missions directed specifically towards individual elements. As part of the
commodity assistance, a trust fund agreement has been signed with UNDP for the procurement
of high priority medicine and vaccine.
Education: This includes supply of paper and financial support to local printing of schoolbooks
and Technical Assistance to train trainers within vocational training and
management/entrepreneurship. The training will, as the only project in Kyrghyzstan, be
implemented by a Danish NGO, that has had contact with Kyrghyzstan since 1990.
Institutional and Democratic Reforms: Based on the new constitution, adopted in May 1993,
with general elections to be held not later than by the end of 1995, Danida decided to support the
democratization process. This was done in the form of both commodity and technical assistance.
One component included support to local Governments, where the Danish Minister of
Development Corporation established the contact between the mayors of the municipalities of
Karakol and Stenløse, later Ballerup, in order to facilitate the development of a sister-city-concept.
Of the DKK 60 million approved for transitional assistance to Kyrghyzstan, more than half was
designated for the health sector, one sixth for the education sector, 5 per cent for the sugar
industry and only a smaller part for the democratization process (1.5 per cent). This distribution
has later been adjusted somewhat. Finally, almost DKK 10 million has been set aside for the
administration of the programme and for contingencies.
As regards the supply of hearing aids, which forms part of the support to the health sector, TSA
was asked to advise on the sustainability of this component in January 1995. TSA suggested that
a Danish NGO should be asked to take over the sub-project, which would make it possible for
the project to continue after the three years of transitional assistance.
8.8.4 Implementation of Interventions
Denmark has no official representation in Kyrghyzstan. The Danish Ambassador in Moscow is
also accredited in Bishkek, but the Moscow embassy does not usually deal with development
assistance and has no staff with competence in that area. On this background, and given Danida's
very limited experience of working in Kyrghyzstan, other means of delivering the transitional
assistance were investigated. At an initial stage it was considered to have the E.U. Commission
to implement the programme. However, Danida found it preferable to have their own people on
location to monitor the programme. Following this, private consultancy companies were invited
to apply to act as monitors for the programme.
As a result of a tendering procedure, a Danish consultancy firm was selected to carry out this
assignment. In April 1994, a one year agreement was signed between Danida and the firm, and in
May a Resident Manager was posted to work in Bishkek. This was one year after the initiation of
the negotiations with the authorities of Kyrghyzstan. The first shipment of sugar beet seeds was
dispatched in April of the same year.
In July 1994 an Inception Report was prepared, including a detailed work plan. Quarterly
Progress Reports were submitted to Danida. The main task of the Resident Manager is to control
and facilitate the deliveries. The consulting firm is financially responsible for the entire
programme, including the hiring of personnel. This includes the monitoring of a Danida/UNDP
trust fund.
It was considered to have Goskominvest, the ministry responsible for the coordination of foreign
investments and donations, to take over responsibility for the project. At one stage it was
proposed that the secretary working at the implementing unit in Bishkek together with someone
from Goskominvest should be trained in project management. The secretary will remain as
project administrator in Kyrghyzstan for at least another year under the continued supervision of
the consulting firm in Denmark.
In April-May 1995, a Danida Review of the programme in Kyrghyzstan was undertaken. The
Review Mission found that the Kyrghyz authorities were highly satisfied with the Danish
assistance, because it is fast disbursing, flexible and directed towards immediate needs mainly
within the social sector.
The Review Mission recommended that in general the present framework for Danida transitional
assistance to Kyrghyzstan should remain unchanged. The activities should only be marginally
adjusted.
8.8.5 Conclusions and Recommendations
The approval of Kyrghyzstan as recipient of transitional assistance appears appropriate: It is a
newly independent state with massive political, economic and social problems, and relatively
poor.
It appears relevant to support the selected sectors in a transitional period. The sectors have been
identified by the country itself and they correspond to Danida priorities for both development
assistance in general and for transitional assistance specifically. The implementation of the
programme includes both an NGO already working in Kyrghyzstan, a trust fund agreement with
UNDP, and projects implemented directly by Danida. As a flexible and creative approach, a
private company has been identified as implementing vehicle in a country that Danida was
inexperienced with.
Some questions may be raised however, about the design of the programme. It does not seem
likely, for example, that hearing aids will relieve the urgent need for basic health care. The main
part of the relatively small components within the democratisation package turned out not to be
particularly fast-disbursing, especially in the case of assistance to the municipalities. It is a
relatively long-term venture to build up a local administration. In summary, it is mainly the
projects within education and agriculture that could be characterised as fast-disbursing. It is also
within these two sectors that the Danish resource base has mainly been involved.
The approach with undertaking an Identification Mission for the planning of the entire transition
programme appears to have been successful in this case. On the other hand, too rigid a plan could
limit the flexibility to adjust the programme during its execution and to incorporate new project
proposals. Some budgetary changes were actually made during the execution of the programme.
The visit of the Danish Minister for Development Cooperation to Kyrghyzstan attracted the
attention of a number of different groups and individuals. However, the project proposals
presented afterwards could not be dealt with since the Danish funds had already been committed
to other activities.
In conclusion, the Danida concept regarding transitional assistance has in general been followed
as regards country and sector selection. However, not all specific interventions, whether
commodity or technical assistance, have been fast disbursing and/or within areas where basic
needs of the country are met. Concerning the implementation of these interventions, a certain
degree of flexibility has been exercised. It could be considered to redirect part of the assistance to
the poorer strata of the population.
Despite the relatively successful implementation of the planned activities, the overall impact of
the Danish transitional assistance investment of DKK 60 million to Kyrghyzstan is limited.
Kyrghyzstan is found to be a country in need of substantial amounts of foreign assistance in the
coming years. Danish assistance for four years, however efficient it may be, can only fill a small
gap.
8.9 Mongolia
8.9.1 Economic and Social Setting
With a population of 2.4 million (1993) and a land area of more than 1.5 million km2, Mongolia
is one of the sparsest inhabited countries of Asia. The elections in Mongolia in July 1990
represented a rupture with a 70 years old centrally controlled political and economic regime, in
which period Mongolia enjoyed Soviet support and assistance in developing its state, economic
and social institutions.
The political reforms were followed by economic reforms towards a market economy supported
by the World Bank, the IMF and the Asian Development Bank. The transition was hampered by
a large foreign debt and a deteriorating economic situation of Mongolia's traditional markets, i.e.
the COMECON countries and the Soviet Union. In 1992, the GDP per capita was estimated at
USD 481, and in 1993 it was down at USD 400.
8.9.2 Transitional Assistance to Mongolia
Danida took part in a UNDP-sponsored donor consultation meeting in Ulaanbaatar in October
1991. At the Round Table discussions, Denmark proposed an initial assistance to Mongolia in
the order of USD 10 million (DKK 75 million) in a transitional period of two years. The decision
was made in consideration of the political development and the worsening economic situation
due to the difficult transition to market economy.
Following the initial grant of DKK 75 million, several extensions followed. In May 1993, the
Danida Board approved an additional grant of DKK 100 million over three years. In 1994, the
period for transitional assistance was extended until the end of 1997. The indicative planning
figure for the total transitional assistance is now DKK 175 million over six years (1992-97).
Mongolia was also considered as a candidate for Programme country status but in the end was
not selected.
8.9.3 Sector and Project Selection
Initially, three 'basic elements' for the assistance were outlined on the basis of the Mongolian
request:
Support to the development towards pluralistic democracy (free press, support to parliament,
support to education reform),
Sector support (sector studies and policy recommendations in the livestock sector, grain
storage, renewable energy and exploitation of silver mines), and
Import support to be determined in cooperation with UNDP, but primarily targeted to the
health and education sectors.
The strategy was revised in October 1992 towards less import support and more assistance
related to projects and institutional development.
In connection with the extension in May 1993, it was decided that the assistance should continue
as commodity assistance and balance of payment support, smaller projects, more far reaching
sector studies, a few multi-bi projects and follow-up on the on-going long-term activities. This
strategy reflected the activities under way and did not represent a change in the scope of the programme.
The strategy was, however, made more clear, and five sectors were defined: Livestock, energy,
education, health and democratisation.
The original outline of the programme (the three basic elements cited above) has more or less
been followed. The sector support mentioned as one of the basic elements expressed itself mostly
in the livestock and education sectors, whereas the possibilities for support to grain storage,
renewable energy and exploitation of silver mines were investigated and found unfeasible. The
concentration on the five sectors has also been followed. Danida has not been very active so far
in the energy sector, but an Urban Heating Project is currently being planned. Despite the limited
programme, Danida has played a very active role in international donor coordination, not least
within the livestock and the education sectors, where Danida has assumed a lead agency role.
The appropriateness of assuming such a role as part of a transitional programme can be discussed
because it demands a larger involvement from Danida than is normally intended with transitional
assistance. It may also give the government and the international donor community a false
impression of a long-term commitment to assist Mongolia, and subsequent difficulties for the
other donors to continue their work after the termination of the Danida programme.
Transitional assistance to Mongolia has been channelled through NGOs and, to some extent,
through multilateral and bilateral channels. Some projects have long-term perspectives such as
institutional development in the reorganisation of the dairy sector, education sector reform and
local government strengthening. In this respect, the transitional development programme in
Mongolia does not differ from regular long-term assistance in a programme country.
Compared with other transitional assistance programmes, a fairly large part of the budget (about
one quarter) has been allocated for commodity supplies.
8.9.4 Implementation of Interventions
The total number of grants to projects under the transitional assistance to Mongolia, including
projects under preparation, is 35, and an amount of DKK 135 million had been committed by end
1995. The Danish Embassy in Beijing, which is accredited to Mongolia, has played a very
important role in identification and monitoring of projects.
Moreover, 16 projects, amounting to DKK 8.8 million, have been approved under the Embassy's
local grant authority. These projects have, in general, been well coordinated with the larger
projects, by supplying goods or by having objectives related to the larger projects but not covered
by these.
Apart from the commodity supply, the most important projects so far have been six large projects
implemented by NGOs. The grants to these projects amount to DKK 70 million. The larger
Danish NGOs have not been part of the programme in Mongolia, but four of the projects are
undertaken by Danish institutions acting as NGOs. The project dealing with support to the
education sector reform 1992-97 (two grants totalling DKK 39 million) is exceptional as much as
it has a very large technical assistance component administered independently by The Royal
Danish School of Educational Studies.
In Mongolia, Danida has been directly involved with preparation and implementation to a degree
which is unusual in the context of transitional assistance. TSA has been involved in project
preparation for projects in the education and livestock sectors. The large livestock programme
was a contributing factor for the decision to place a Danida financed adviser for three years in the
Ministry of Food and Agriculture.
Projects of a total value of DKK 18 million were granted outside the transitional development
programme before instructions in December 1994 changed this practice. These grants were given
to external advisers, emergency aid, fellowships and a multi-bi project.
8.9.5 Results of country evaluation
A selection of 11 transitional assistance projects in Mongolia were visited in the field in the
context of the present evaluation. The findings of the evaluation team are presented in volume
two to this report.
It was found that, in general, the projects appear to have a strong impact on the
users/beneficiaries. The small democracy projects run by local establishments have the strongest
prospects for high impact, together with the dairy privatisation project. In the case of larger
development projects the results are more mixed as could be expected, but generally at
respectable levels.
6 of the 11 projects are found to have strong links to the poverty alleviation objective, especially
those targeted at the education and health sectors. Local government strengthening is also linked
to poverty alleviation in that it aims to keep local administration (to a large extent schools and
clinics) functioning. Another five projects show more indirect links with this objective.
Three projects have strong links with women in development, whereas only an eco-tourism
project (which never took off) was directly targeted at having a positive influence on the
environment. 3 projects are found to be directly supportive to the development towards
democracy, with two other projects (education and livestock) having potential for indirectly
supporting this aspect.
Of the 11 projects visited 5 projects include substantial supplies of Danish equipment and/or
technical assistance which in total accounts for 50% of the value of the visited projects.
7 projects were found to have an appropriate time-frame. The remaining 4 projects are found to
have a time frame that is too short, 3 of these being the capacity-building projects with strong
Danish involvement.
The larger development projects show more mixed prospects with regard to sustainability than
the locally-based democracy projects. Multilaterally-executed projects generally have good
prospects of becoming sustainable due to their continued presence and integration in the relevant
government institutions. The problems with sustainability of the larger reform-linked projects are
partly due to weaknesses in the Ministries of Agriculture and Education.
Some import support projects such as the timely supply of diesel when the country was freezing,
the drugs supply through UNDP, and the materials for the production of schoolbooks were all
successful.
An important part of the Mongolia programme is executed by Danish institutions acting as
NGOs, or by Danida itself. 4 projects worth no less than 44% of the total allocations to the
Mongolia programme are executed by Danish institutions while Danida, including the Beijing
Embassy, directly executed 22 projects at a value of 23% of the allocations. Danish private
companies executed 13% of the project volume.
The strong involvement of the Beijing Embassy has been an important asset to the programme.
Project execution by Danish institutions or NGOs with no prior experience or contacts in
Mongolia and limited international experience in general, tends to complicate implementation.
8.9.6 Conclusions
The transitional assistance to Mongolia has, in general, been fast implemented and well
coordinated with other donor initiatives. The decision about concentration into five sectors, made
at an early stage, has in general been followed.
Some projects cannot be expected to be sustainable within a short period of time, and any solid
handing-over arrangements are unclear. An "end-of-programme" situation should have been
described along with the strategy at the initiation stage. This would have made the withdrawal of
assistance both easier and more safe.
8.10 Namibia
8.10.1 Economic and Social Setting
Namibia achieved independence in 1991, after 70 years of South African rule and under the same apartheid legislation as in South Africa itself. Since independence, the Government has displayed a strong commitment to national reconciliation in accordance with the Constitution.
In 1992, per capita GNP was USD 1,610. However, this average indicator masks an income
distribution which is one of the most skewed in the world. In terms of consumption, the 1%
richest of the households consume as much as the poorest 50%(2).
The population of Namibia was estimated at 1.5 million in 1992 of which less than one third
lives in urban areas. 40-45,000 exiles returned following independence. On top of this,
approximately 30,000 demobilised military troops joined the labour force. 40% of the labour
force of 550,000 are in gainful employment while the remaining 60% are un- or underemployed.
In 1992 GNP was USD 2,415 million, of which multinational firms and settler farmers accounted
for most - with subsistence farming contributing less than 10%. The uneven distribution is also
evident when looking at ownership of productive assets: Less than one percent of the population
have freehold owning 44% of the total land base.
Namibia puts high priority on education and agriculture. The land distribution has made a land
reform programme essential.
8.10.2 Transitional Assistance to Namibia
In the years prior to independence, Denmark provided assistance through the apartheid
appropriations. Afterwards, this was followed by transitional assistance which to some extent
became a continuation and expansion of previous activities.
Following meetings with the Nordic Countries for coordinating support for Namibia, Denmark
pledged a grant of minimum DKK 40 million per year for 2-3 years for bilateral transitional assistance. In January 1991, an official agreement was signed with the Government of Namibia.
The period for support was later extended to five years totalling approximately DKK 200 million.
The other Nordic countries pledged considerably larger amounts.
The decision to include Namibia as a recipient country for transitional aid may have been
influenced by the large involvement of the other Nordic countries. Another important factor was
to continue initiatives carried out by NGOs during the years of apartheid appropriations. This
appropriation was in the order of DKK 25 million per year. The question was whether there, at
that time, was any real option but to continue the programme in Namibia as it may have seemed
politically strange to end a long period of support to the struggle against a racist political system
at a time when the country perhaps most needed external assistance.
That Namibia is very close to be too wealthy to receive aid according to Danish aid policy was
not seen as an obstacle(3). This was due to the very uneven distribution of the wealth.
Namibia was a candidate for inclusion on the list of programme countries and expectations were
high, not least on the part of the NGOs with established lists to SWAPO. However, in the end
Namibia was not selected as a programme country.
Allocations under transitional assistance ended in 1994 when the total amount pledged had been
committed. Of the total of DKK 245 million committed, DKK 187 million had been spent up to
31/12 1995. A few of the projects are still under implementation under the transitional assistance
appropriations.
8.10.3 Sector and Project Selection
As a result of the meetings with the Nordic Countries for coordinating support to Namibia, the
strategy for Danish transitional assistance was initially to support projects within the agricultural
and education sectors.
The majority of projects fall within the education and productive sector although projects were
also found within land use planning (remote sensing), slum upgrading and fishery. With the
delivery of a fisheries inspection vessel, the fishery sector accounts for one fifth of the funds
committed. This particular project was coordinated closely with NORAD, who had been designated to support the sector. One large project provided budget support within the agricultural
sector (technical schools, meat control etc.).
A detailed sector strategy was never worked out other than the general coordination with the
Nordic countries. In general, the project portfolio under transitional assistance to Namibia is
characterised as reactive rather than proactive.
The advantage of this modality has been that specific opportunities have been pursued as they
arose. This has provided a great deal of flexibility once an opportunity was presented.
8.10.4 Implementation of Interventions
A total of 44 project have received support. This includes eight smaller projects (DKK 5 million)
and 27 projects under the Local Grant Authority (DKK 8 million).
Most of the funds committed have been channelled through Danish NGOs (DKK 162 million).
The remaining through the local grant authority (DKK 8 million) or Government to Government
support (DKK 72 million).
Administrative responsibility in Danida has been placed in S.7 who has involved TSA and the
Danish Embassy as appropriate. In general, the Embassy played an important role in the
development of the programme.
8.10.5 Results of country evaluation
A selection of 12 transitional assistance projects in Namibia were visited in the field in the
context of the present evaluation. The findings of the evaluation team are presented in volume
two to this report.
It was found that the transitional assistance programme to Namibia overall presents results as
good or sometimes better than any country programme, not least due to the commitment and
professionalism of the executing Danish NGOs. In some cases however, the injection of large
amounts of money in a short time has led to problems that could have been foreseen and avoided.
Basically, it is risky business to embark on long-term exercises with policy implications with the
knowledge that the assistance will not be able to see the undertaking to the end - or at least
follow it up to a point when discontinuation can be justified on technical grounds rather than
administrative ones.
5 projects were found to be targeted directly at poverty alleviation. 4 projects were found to have
strong links with women in development, while 6 would have a positive influence on the
environment. 4 projects are found to be directly supportive to the development towards
democracy, with one project having potential for supporting this aspect.
Of the 12 projects visited 6 projects include supply of Danish equipment and/or technical
assistance. One project, the fisheries inspection vessel, represents close to 100% supply of
Danish equipment and technical assistance. On average, the 12 projects represent approximately
39% procurement from Denmark. If the fisheries inspection vessel is excluded from the above,
the percentage decreases to only 16%.
In several cases, the evaluation team was met with expectations for extension on the government
side. It was expected that towards the end these projects would be subject to a technical
evaluation which would recommend on their future needs "like in normal practice". The
particularities about these being "transitional" projects were not fully understood. Likewise, the
closing of the Danish embassy did cause some bewilderment in government circles.
8.10.6 Conclusions
Transitional assistance to Namibia in general is justified. Namibia was/is in a period of transition
to democracy, and Denmark had supported Namibia for a number of years through the apartheid
appropriations. The fact that the GNP per capita is close to the limits for countries normally
supported by Danida does not alter the appropriateness of transitional aid to a country where
income distribution is as unevenly distributed as is the case in Namibia.
The institutional absorbtion capacity in the new democracy seems to have been overestimated
leading to a number of projects with limited institutional support from the government side. Secondly, the time-frame for implementing projects concerned with institutional strengthening had
been underestimated. As a consequence, some projects have been unable to reach their
objectives within the specified time.
Two large projects account for over 50% of total funds committed: Delivery and operation of a
fisheries inspection vessel and introduction of Life Science in schools. Both projects are still
under way. Fisheries was not initially part of the strategy for transitional aid but was included as
the opportunity arose in connection with a Danish Ministry of Fisheries inspection vessel being
phased out. The Life Science project was started under the former apartheid appropriation and, as
its positive impact on the school system was recognized, it was extended and the budget
increased. Whereas the Namibian Ministry of Fisheries should be able to take over the inspection
vessel and operate it with directly hired officers until the time when Nambians have been trained
and obtained the necessary practice, it is unclear whether the reform work started under Life
Science will have reached a stage where it can be sustained and developed further by local
means. It must be hoped that the period for transitional assistance is not defined so rigidly that
projects with a documented positive impact, such as life science, will be terminated only because
a decision on a time-frame was made in the past.
Grant authorization has, in general and with help from the Embassy, been prompt in Namibia and
especially for surveys, formulation missions and the budget support project. Quick processing
seems to have been an important factor for the relatively speedy increase in delivery from DKK 8
million at the start in 1990 to DKK 37 million the year after.
8.11 South Africa
8.11.1 Economic and Social Setting
The Republic of South Africa is approximately 30 times the size of Denmark with 1,221,000
km2. The population is about 40 million people (1992) of which 13% are white. Around 65% of
the population resides in urban areas although more than half of the black population lives in
rural areas.
The political, economic and social history has been dominated by the Apartheid policies from
1948 to 1991 when the core apartheid legislation for the policy was abandoned.
The GNP of South Africa was in 1992 USD 2,900 per capita, making it the most wealthy country
in the region. However, the distribution of the wealth is very uneven. Over 80% of the black
population in rural areas live below the official poverty line and an average black household has
an income only 15% of an average white household. In accordance with the Land Act of 1913,
50,000 white farmers control 87% of the land in the country while 1.3 million black farmers must
share the remaining 13%.
South Africa is also one of the most violence-ridden countries in the world. A homicide is
committed on average every 29 minutes in the Republic, and a case of rape is reported to the
police on average every 17 minutes.
The first elections based on universal suffrage in April 1994, with the resulting establishment of
a transitional government for five years under the leadership of Nelson Mandela and the ANC
was the decisive event that signified the change in South Africa's status as the world's pariah, to
become a full member of the international community. Support came forward from all corners of
the world.
Later on, local elections were held in November 1994 and a new constitution was passed by
Parliament in 1995.
8.11.2 Transitional Assistance to South Africa
Denmark has given aid to victims of apartheid between 1965 and 1993 through the so-called
apartheid appropriation. In 1988-92 the yearly budget for this was DKK 80 million DKK. Up
until 1993 Denmark spent DKK 975 million on the apartheid appropriations. The majority of this
aid has been for humanitarian and educational purposes. One third of the apartheid appropriation
has been channelled through international organisations, in particular the UN. The remaining
two-thirds went through three large Danish NGOs (DanChurchAid, Ibis and Fagbevægelsens U-landsSekretariat) in the period 1983-91.
From 1991 through 1994 a special aid programme through the African National Congress (ANC)
was implemented, totalling DKK 34 million. An evaluation report in 1994 concluded that the
programme was successful in reaching its political objectives and partly successful in achieving
specific project objectives(4). It further concluded that there were not adequate guidelines, lines of
communication were confusing and that the combination of short term political objectives with
long term developmental objectives was problematic.
Support through transitional assistance was first decided upon in March 1992 although at the
same time it was decided to await further development in the democratisation process before a
final decision was made.
Transitional assistance in an amount of DKK 600 million over a 5 year period was approved in
January 1994. Later, in April 1994, this figure was increased to DKK 750 million. A government
agreement to this effect was signed with South Africa in November 1994.
One main reason for the selection of South Africa for transitional assistance is the long political
and financial involvement of Denmark in the struggle against the apartheid policies. To abruptly
end assistance to South Africa, when this long standing goal was reached, would have sent the
wrong political message.
That South Africa is officially too rich to receive aid according to Danish aid policy was not seen
as an obstacle. First, the income distribution in South Africa is very uneven. Secondly, South
Africa may be very suitable for support over a short period since adequate institutions are
established to absorb and benefit from such short term interventions.
8.11.3 Sector and Project Selection
During the period 1992-95, much work has been put in to developing a country strategy for transitional aid to South Africa, and several missions and preinvestigations were launched. The country strategy came out in June 1995 and 4 areas for support were determined, namely: Continued Democratisation and Violence Prevention: DKK 150 mio. Land Reform and Rural Development (incl. water supply): DKK 100 mio. Education: DKK 100 mio. Black Private Sector and Employment Promotion: DKK 200 mio.
The remaining DKK 200 million was reserved for NGO-implemented projects within the same
areas.
The selection of areas to support is closely related to the new South African government's
priorities and especially its ambitious Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP).
Furthermore, the strategy emphasizes that the assistance should contribute to specific policy
development.
The strategy also emphasizes that NGO projects should have a value-added element, e.g. through
provision of expertise and knowledge otherwise not available in South Africa. As a consequence,
funding through NGOs cannot be used for support to 'financial contributive support' to the
activities of South African NGO partners. Such local NGOs are however receiving funding
through the many LGA projects approved by the embassy.
8.11.4 Implementation of Interventions
Table 8.2 shows the distribution of projects within the four priority areas defined in the country
strategy. It should be noted that several projects fall into more than one area in which case a
choice of the prime category has been the deciding factor in the categorisation. Please see annex
2 for the full inventory of approved projects up until end 1995.
Administrative responsibility for all projects in South Africa is with Danida Country Office, S.7,
which involves the Embassy and TSA as appropriate. Although a large number of the projects are
being implemented by NGOs over the NGO framework agreements, the responsibility is with S.7
rather than with the NGO section.
To date, 115 projects have been identified and approved over the transitional assistance
allocation, 47 of which are being implemented through Danish NGOs.
Table 8.2 Project Distribution in Categories:
8.11.5 Review of country strategy
Assistance to a large, medium-income country with extensive technical and administrative
capacity is bound to differ in nature from the assistance given to most of Danida's programme
and transitional assistance countries. In South Africa, the main problems are political more than
due to lack of resources as such. In overall financial terms, and in spite of high levels of
pledging, donor assistance to South Africa counts like a drop in the ocean.
The development of a strategy that will effectively address the key problems and make use of
well-defined, highly strategic inputs drawn from areas of comparative advantage, is therefore
crucial. It may be added to this that most donor assistance will, due to South Africa's status as
medium-income country, be given in the form of export- and investment guarantees which will
normally not lend themselves to strategic action in these priority areas.
The overall objective of Danish transitional assistance to South Africa is, for a limited period of
time, to make a contribution to the consolidation of the new democracy, and support the
alleviation of the grave poverty problem.
Stability and progress is threatened from several quarters: the rampant violence which dates back
many years and has proven extremely difficult to contain; the high expectations on the part of the
majority population; pressure from radical political groups, and hostility from parts of the civil
service. The agenda faced by the new government is indeed a formidable one.
The transitional assistance programme aims at these strategic targets in various ways. Assistance
to reduce violence started already before the 1994 elections and is being continued in the country
strategy. Land reform, rural development and urban employment promotion are all fields which
can have an effect on narrowing the gap between people's expectations and what the government
is able to provide, not least through the application of participatory and community-based
approaches which create capacity for self-help at the local level. Decades of the hated Bantu
education system makes reform in the education sector an important strategic area.
The close integration of transitional assistance into the RDP ensures local linkage and
coordination of activities and strengthens the likelihood of the results being sustained.
The links to Danish development objectives are clear. Poverty alleviation and employment
creation are main objectives of the RDP and will provide the political frame of the Danish effort.
The 1996 Constitution has become a model as regards anti-discriminatory legislation including,
obviously, gender discrimination, and the programme gives good opportunities for action to
promote women's rights and alleviate the plight of, for example, the many female heads of
households. A number of concrete actions are directly targeted at democracy, human rights and
curbing violence. The environmental concern is less expressed in the transitional assistance
programme; this is due to a number of environmental projects currently being under preparation
for financing by DANCED, the Danish Cooperation for Environment and Development which
will serve as a natural supplement to the Danida programme.
There is considerable involvement of part of the Danish resource base in the form of NGOs. No
large-scale delivery of Danish commodities or technical assistance is expected but the Danish
private sector is encouraged to become engaged in the development of small-scale enterprises,
and in other cooperation on usual commercial terms. Implementation through multilateral
channels is insignificant.
The time frame is five years. This would appear to be short for such a large development
assistance programme. However, keeping in mind the special conditions in South Africa an
ordered, planned handover to the government and other local partners may in fact be more
feasible here than in almost any other country receiving transitional assistance.
Still, the time frame may be optimistic: disbursements in 1994 and 1995 were DKK 84 and 120
million respectively, against the planned DKK 90 and 155 million.
8.11.6 Conclusions
In addition to the internal conditions in South Africa itself, it should not be forgotten that the
country has the potential to play a strategic role as the locomotive of economic development in
the region in much broader terms. This could be of great importance to several African countries
with whom Denmark has development programme cooperation. South African companies are
indeed already busy in pursuing commercial enterprises in many neighbouring countries. This
potential can of course only be deployed under conditions of political stability and a conducive
economic environment.
The country strategy has succeeded in identifying areas which are of crucial importance to a
peaceful transition, and the use of the transitional assistance modality is very well suited as a
vehicle to carry it out. Even with regard to the land reform where Danida has assumed the role of
lead donor - something which would not be advisable in most transitional countries - it should be
possible to give meaningful, temporary assistance and yet ensure a decent and planned
withdrawal after five years. This is notwithstanding the known legal and other obstacles to a
redistribution of productive land which are almost certain to make the process painful.
The high GNP per capita does not alter the appropriateness of transitional assistance to South
Africa when specifically targeted to support the fragile transition to a democratic society, against
many odds, and aimed at groups in society which generally lie below the poverty line.
However, certain activities such as support to rural development, including water supply, can go
on for many years, and the time perspective here may prove to be too short.
Transitional assistance to South Africa is an appropriate continuation of the Danish support to
anti-apartheid initiatives over many years, politically and through support for victims of
apartheid.
The preparation of the country strategy was done in such a way as to involve a broad range of the
interested parties in Denmark. NGOs and the private sector were heard through information
meetings and hearings. The Danish private business sector has been actively involved in
preparing the business to business programme.
Altogether, the transitional assistance programme was a very well prepared framework for
projects which can effectively contribute to the achievement of stability and progress in South
Africa.
1. The first ADB trust fund project did not include Danish companies on the short list. 2. Source: NDP1, Namibia First National Development Plan, Draft, 1995 3. The Danida limit for being granted assistance was in 1991 and 1992 fixed at a GNP per capita of USD 1,645 and USD 1,705, respectively. While the GNP per capita in Namibia in 1992 was estimated at USD 1,610. 4. Evaluation report 1994/2: "The Danish Special Program to Support Projects through the African National Congress, South Africa" by Nordic Consulting Group April 1994 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
