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2.3 Principal Developments in the Democratic Republic of the CongoEvents in eastern DRC in late 1996 and early 1997 were summarized earlier from the perspective of security in Rwanda. A more detailed account of the forced closure of the refugee camps in North and South Kivu by the AFDL with support from the RPA is provided in Annex 4. As AFDL/RPA forces pursued the ex-FAR and Hutu militia mingled in with the refugees they advanced westwards into Zaire. Having captured Kisangani in February 1997 the AFDL forces advanced on Kinshasa itself. The ageing President Mobutu flew into exile in April and in May Kinshasa came under the control of AFDL forces headed by Laurent Kabila who had close links to RPF leaders in Rwanda and to leaders in Uganda. Among Kabila’s first changes were the renaming of the country to the Democratic Republic of Congo and the appointment of Banyarwanda to key posts. However, the popular Congolese perception was that he had been ‘enthroned by foreigners’ and he subsequently came under pressure to distance himself from his backers in Rwanda and Uganda. In February 1998 he removed Banyarwanda from Government posts and ordered Ban-yamulenge troops back to the Kivus. In August there was a mutiny in Kinshasa and an uprising in the Kivus by the Rassemblement Congolais pour las démocratie (RCD) and the Mouvement de Libération du Congo (MLC). The RCD and MLC were openly supported by Ugandan and Rwandan troops. Their rapid westward advance to oust Kabila was halted only when troops from Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia intervened in support of Kabila (subsequently troops from Sudan and Chad also joined the alliance supporting Kabila and troops from Burundi joined in support of the Rwandan forces). From a situation in 1996 that was primarily a contest between the RPF and the ex-FAR and Hutu militia in the refugee camps in Zaire, the events of 1998 escalated the conflict to a multinational confrontation with many different agendas at play and the first pan-African war. Rwan-dan troops remained in DRC until October 2002 when, officially at least, the last troops were withdrawn to Rwanda. Pre-existing tensions between different ethnic and political groups in the Congo were exploited by the different foreign armies and Congolese armed groups and the security situation in the eastern part of the country became extremely complex and volatile. Exploitation of the Congo’s considerable mineral wealth (coltan, diamonds, copper, cobalt and gold) became an important factor in the dynamics of the conflicts with some foreign governments using the income from illegal mineral exploitation to fund their military inside DRC and to boost national incomes and the personal fortunes of certain individuals. The human costs of the conflict were extraordinarily high. In May 2000 in the first of a series of surveys of mortality in Eastern DRC the International Rescue Committee estimated excess mortality over the previous 22 months at 1.7 million as a result of direct killings, displacement, cutting off of large population groups from their traditional supply routes and the breakdown of health services. IRC’s figures were to be borne out by their subsequent surveys in 2001 (which estimated excess mortality at 2.5 million) and in 2003 (which estimated excess mortality at 3 million). The response by the international humanitarian community to such shocking estimates of mortality was limited and quite inadequate in relation to the scale of the needs. The lack of security and the consequent lack of access to large areas, the high costs of operating in such a large and logistically difficult environment, the lack of donor funding for operations in the DRC and the lack of international media coverage of the conflict(s) and the humanitarian crisis are all cited by humanitarian agencies as critical factors contributing to the inadequate response. Others have also identified the Integrated Mission approach adopted by the UN and a mistaken emphasis on ‘peace-building’ rather than ‘life-saving’ approaches as being significant contributory factors.9 After an April 1999 abortive attempt by President Gaddafi to broker a ceasefire, peace efforts were then led by Zambia on behalf of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). After protracted negotiations the key parties agreed on a ceasefire deal that was signed by the state actors (DRC, Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe) in Lusaka in July 1999 and by the RCD and MLC the following month. Significantly the UN was not a party to the agreement. Among its provisions the Lusaka Agreement called for the setting up of an ‘Inter-Congolese Dialogue’ between the various political parties, the establishment of a mechanism for disarming militias and armed groups and for the deployment of an “appropriate force” by the United Nations in collaboration with OAU “to track down all armed groups in the DRC”. The UN Security Council responded cautiously to the Lusaka Agreement. Initially the Security Council approved the deployment of 500 military observers through a UN Military Observer Mission in the Congo (MONUC) and in February 2000 an expansion to 5,500 military personnel was approved with a mandate that was based predominantly on a mandate under Chapter VI of the UN Charter but which contained a Chapter VII component that allowed for a limited provision of protection for the civilian population10. However, member states were dilatory in providing the necessary contingents. Over three years later by April 2003, four months after a further expansion to 8,700 had been approved, MONUC’s military strength stood at 4,309. Direct confrontations between soldiers of the Ugandan People’s Defense Force (UPDF) and Rwandan (RPA) troops over control of access to diamond mines took place in and around Kisangani in August 1999 and then again in May and June 2000 when an estimated 1,000 civilians were killed and significant damage caused to the city’s infrastructure. Violent demonstrations took place in Kinshasa against the UN and the perceived feebleness of its response. The Security Council identified Rwanda and Uganda as aggressors in the DRC and called for their troops to be withdrawn. In January 2001 Laurent Kabila was assassinated by one of his bodyguards and was replaced by his son Joseph Kabila. The new President appeared more willing to seek solutions to the conflict prompting a closer engagement by the Security Council with the DRC peace process. In February 2002 the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, agreed to in the Lusaka Agreement, finally got underway at Sun City in South Africa. Thereafter the peace process began to gather greater momentum, though with periodic setbacks and delays. In July 2002 the Governments of DRC and Rwanda agreed on a calendar for the withdrawal of the RPA from DRC and the DRC agreed to track down elements of the former Rwandan Army (FAR) and Hutu militia still operating in the DRC. Verification of these actions would be undertaken by South Africa and MONUC. The first group of Rwandan combatants (ex-FAR and Hutu militia) were repatriated to Rwanda in September 2002. By March 2004 10,500 Rwandan combatants had been repatriated. In December 2002 the Congolese parties to the Inter-Congolese Dialogue signed an agreement for a political transition process leading within two years to legislative and presidential elections starting from the time the Transitional Government was actually established. (The Transitional Government was eventually formed on 30th June 2003.) Even though MONUC was still well below the troop levels authorized by the UN Security Council in February 2000, in December 2002 the Security Council approved an expansion of MONUC’s strength to 8,700 with a mandate to implement the Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement (DDRRR) Program. International pressure upon Uganda and Rwanda to withdraw their forces was also influenced by investigations by the UN. Damning and detailed investigations of the human rights abuses in the Eastern DRC by the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights were one source for such pressure. Another was the work of the ‘UN Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of the Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’. Their first report submitted to the Security Council in April 2001 was controversial and disputed by Rwanda and Uganda but was borne out by subsequent reports. In a third report published in October 2002. ‘elite networks’ in Uganda, Rwanda and the DRC were identified as being involved in the illegal trade and individuals benefiting from the trade within the various armed forces and rebel movements were named. In May 2003 two weeks of intense violence in and around Bunia in Ituri Province killed hundreds of civilians and caused widespread population displacements. The Security Council responded more decisively than previously, approving an immediate deployment of 3,000 troops for a three-month French-led intervention (‘Operation Artemis’) with a Chapter VII mandate to operate alongside MONUC. In July the Security Council approved a significant strengthening of MONUC’s mandate to a Chapter VII mandate and an increase in its force level to 10,800 to enable it to take over from ‘Operation Artemis’. The new mandate authorized the use of force in Ituri and the Kivus to protect civilians and ensure safe passage for humanitarian agencies. In September 2003 Operation Artemis ended and MONUC established the ‘Ituri Brigade’ which was deployed to locations throughout Ituri, thereby improving MONUC’s ability to verify the withdrawal of Ugandan (UPDF) troops and monitor the activities of the different political parties and armed groups. In March 2004 MONUC began deploying the ‘Kivu Brigade’ with a planned troop level of 3,500 in Bukavu. Within three months however a force of mutineers within the army of the Transitional Government (Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo -FARDC) who are widely believed to have been encouraged and supported by Rwanda attacked and took control of Bukavu in June. During their six-day occupation scores of civilians were killed and raped. The 600 MONUC soldiers in Bukavu did not attempt to support the loyalist troops or to oppose the mutineers. Intense diplomatic activity including pressure from the UN Security Council and US and European diplomats on the mutineers and also on the Government of Rwanda including the threat of the deployment of an EU force similar to ‘Operation Artemis’ resulted in the withdrawal of the mutineers in June. The peace process remains extremely fragile. It remains to be seen which vision for the Congo of the future eventually succeeds: a united Congo controlled from Kinshasa or a federalist Congo with considerable autonomy being given to the eastern part of the country and maintaining strong links with Rwanda and Uganda. 9. Multi Donor Mission Report: Democratic Republic of Congo Report May 27 - June 8 2002 Stockton, Nicholas (2003) ‘Humanitarianism Bound: Coherence and Catastrophe in the Congo 1998-2002’ 10. A Chapter VI peacekeeping operation is normally deployed to help keep a peace that already exists and the peacekeepers are not authorized to use force other than self-protection. Chapter VII peacekeeping operations, also referred to as ‘Peace Enforcement Operations’, authorize UN peacekeepers to use military force if necessary to restore peace and security |
