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3. A Preliminary Assessment of the Influence of the Joint EvaluationThis chapter analyses the results of a review of 64 books, articles and reports dealing with the Rwanda genocide, its aftermath, and related subjects, as well as interviews with 49 key informants knowledgeable in these fields. Most of the literature reviewed is in English. Most, but not all, key informants were at least generally aware of the Joint Evaluation. They have cited it in their own works and they can identify publications where the Joint Evaluation has been cited. While the literature typically does not explicitly identify the impact and influence of the Evaluation, 37 of the 64 sources contain at least one reference to the Joint Evaluation. The frequency and extent to which some sources cite the Joint Evaluation show that it has been taken seriously. We therefore conclude, with some caveats, that the Joint Evaluation has had a wide reach in the research and policy communities. One of the unique features of the Evaluation, according to key informants, was that it tackled policy issues. Therefore, it might be expected to have influenced policy issues. Of particular interest are major post-1995 reports intended to directly influence policy and programs. The reports are listed alphabetically below and in chronological order on the next page:
Because of their importance to this assessment, the four formal inquiries into events leading up to and during the genocide – by the Belgian Senate, the French National Assembly, the UN (the Carlsson Report) and the OAU – have been reviewed in some detail and the results are presented in Annex 3.
Five of these eleven reports refer explicitly to the Joint Evaluation. The Final Report of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (1997) cites the entire Joint Evaluation in its Bibliography and Chapter 3 refers to the Evaluation’s analysis (in Study 3) of a lack of a coordinated political strategy by the international community. In a supporting volume to Responsibility to Protect (Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001), the Joint Evaluation is cited in the Bibliography and in the discussion of lack of political will. Both the Belgian and the French parliamentary inquiries cite the Joint Evaluation, the Belgian report containing 14 references and the French, two references (see Annex 2). The OAU Report of the Panel of Eminent Personalities, Rwanda: the Preventable Genocide (2001), cites the Joint Evaluation 43 times, far more than any other source. Despite its high degree of relevance, the Joint Evaluation is not cited by the other six reports. In some cases there were no literature references of any kind, viz., the DAC Policy Statement of 1997 and the Guidelines of 2001, as well as the UN/Carlsson Report of 1999. But the UN Srebrenica Report of 1999 and the UN “Brahimi” Report on UN Peace Operations of 2000 make no reference to the Joint Evaluation, notwithstanding their references to other literature.11 All 64 of the books, reports, and articles reviewed were published since 1995. Each publication deals with one or more of the issues examined in this paper.12 A majority of these sources – 37 of 64 (or 58%) – cites the Joint Evaluation. If indirect citations were to be counted, the number would undoubtedly be higher.13 Most sources make one or two brief citations or bibliographic references, although some sources cite the Joint Evaluation relatively frequently or extensively (e.g. see Adelman and Suhrke, Barnett, Forman and Patrick, Jones, Minear, OAU and the World Bank in Annex 2). Although there has been a huge expansion in scholarly research in all the areas touched by the Joint Evaluation, the current assessment does not address that literature except insofar as it directly relates to, or reflects, the Joint Evaluation. We do not know to what extent the Evaluation influenced that research, although anecdotal evidence indicates the influence was considerable. Some other observations of note emerge from Annex 2. A chapter on the political use of Rwandan refugees in Kivu, in a recent book edited by André Guichaoua (2004), makes relatively extensive use of Study 3, which is referred to as a “global analysis pertaining to movements of the Rwandan population” (p. 429; see item 24 of Annex 2). Other references to the Joint Evaluation in the reviewed literature are in the areas of genocide prevention, early warning, conflict prevention and management, and human rights. Linda Melvern draws on Study 2 in making the following observation:
At one level, it would appear that two key OECD/DAC policy guidelines on Conflict, Peace, and Development Cooperation (CPDC) have ignored the Joint Evaluation. Neither the Policy Statement of 1997 (item 37 in Annex 2) nor the Guidelines issued in 2001 (item 41) refer to the Joint Evaluation in any explicit way. However, neither of these documents cites any other literature. More importantly, both documents reflect the substance of the Joint Evaluation, especially the longer 2001 Guidelines. DAC Secretariat officials who have been involved in this area agree that the Joint Evaluation provided a major stimulus to these policy efforts, including establishment of the CPDC Task Force.14 The World Bank, in its 1998 post-conflict “framework paper” (Post-Conflict Reconstruc-tion and the Role of the World Bank), asserts that DAC policy was “influenced significantly” by the conclusions of the Joint Evaluation (World Bank 1998b: 21). Moreover, the Bank itself drew heavily on the Joint Evaluation. The framework paper devotes a one-page box to the main conclusions and recommendations of the Joint Evaluation (22) and the Bank’s Operations Evaluation Department (OED), in its Review of the World Bank’s Experience in Post-Conflict Reconstruction (1998), draws extensively on the Joint Evaluation in its Rwanda Case Study and utilizes the Joint Evaluation in its conceptual framework for its Synthesis Report.15 The Joint Evaluation is identified in the literature in a number of ways. In fact, among the 34 entries in Annex 2 that cited the Joint Evaluation, 18 identifying labels were used, including:
How is it that these identifiers vary so widely? A conscious reason at the time was to recognize adequately the contributions of the lead authors to each Study. However, the wide range of ways in which the Joint Evaluation has been cited may have contributed to the fact that the overall body of work that is the Joint Evaluation is not known as widely as it might have been. The fact that the set of five reports was not published and distributed by an established publisher in book form may also have been a factor. In fact, two key informants, the first, a prolific scholar on conflict issues in Africa, and the second, the project manager for the Brahimi report, indicated that they had not heard of the Joint Evaluation before. This could well account for no reference to the Joint Evaluation in the latter report, as well as the lack of references in other sources listed in Annex 2. Two well-known sources cited in Annex 2 identified the fact that one of the Joint Evaluation Steering Committee Members, France, withdrew from the Committee after seeing the draft report (Melvern in A People Betrayed: the Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide, and des Forges in Leave None to Tell the Story). It would have been preferable, of course, if France had remained a member of the Steering Committee.16 But, ironically, its withdrawal may have drawn wider attention to the report than would otherwise have been the case. The main conclusions of this review of key informants’ views and a sample of relevant literature is that the Joint Evaluation has had a significant impact on the literature dealing with complex emergencies and humanitarian assistance and a mixed impact on the policies and practices of donor and development agencies. One lesson is that for widespread dissemination and awareness, a commercial publishing house should be utilized. We also recommend that a study be undertaken of the adoption of changes in organizational structures, procedures, and practices resulting from the Joint Evaluation, the JEFF, and other policy statements, such as those of the OECD/DAC. One key informant made the following relevant observation: “My own sense is the JEEAR [Joint Evaluation] quickly entered into the folk law of the humanitarian world, and within it achieved wide recognition. Outside of it, even in closely related fields such as security and development, it got less star treatment. Also, I find now that many people who entered the business post-1998 have not heard of it. This I think has to do with the continued lack of formal institutional memory arrangements. We use the JEEAR in our teaching, but it is now an academic historical document for students, not a living one.” (Peter Walker, personal communication). 11. The DAC Guidelines on Security Reform employ some references but none to the Joint Evaluation. The 8-year interval between the Joint Evaluation and the Guidelines may be part of the explanation. The absence of references in the Brahimi and Srebrenica reports are more puzzling. An explanation in the case of the Brahimi report is offered later in the text. 12. Based on literature reviews by the authors and comments from key informants, the 61 publications are believed to be broadly representative. The results of the entire review and further details about its composition are summarized in Annex 2 at the end of the Assessment. One book not included because it was published in 1995, before the Joint Evaluation, is the Africa Rights volume by Alex de Waal and Rakyia Omar, Rwanda: Death, Despair, Defiance. London: Africa Rights (1995). This massive collection of eyewitness accounts of the genocide has become a required reference for those wishing to gain a deeper understanding of what happened. 13. For example, the volume edited by Zartman and Rasmussen (entry no.64 in Annex 2) does not cite the Joint Evaluation but one of its contributors cites Minear and Guillot (1996), Soldiers to the Rescue: Humanitarian Lessons from Rwanda, which does cite the Joint Evaluation (entry no.33). Individual donors and development agencies, including USAID, the World Bank, and others, have adopted policies on aid for conflict prevention, recovery, and reconstruction, including the creation of special units to include and promulgate the lessons of the Joint Evaluation. 14. Telephone interviews with Development Cooperation Directorate Staff (DAC Secretariat), June 21-23, 2004. The DAC was represented on the Joint Evaluation Steering Committee even though, owing to lack of consensus on the part of all DAC members, the Joint Evaluation itself could not be carried out through the DAC. Two studies prepared for the DAC CPDC Task Force do cite the Joint Evaluation (entries 35 and 36 in Annex 2). 15. The OED Synthesis Report credits the Joint Evaluation for stressing the political nature of complex emergencies and draws on its 4-fold evaluation criteria for humanitarian emergencies: connectedness, coherence, coverage, and appropriateness (World Bank 1998a: 2, 43). 16. France objected to implications in Study 1 and Study 2 that France continued to supply arms to the Rwandan Government after the beginning of the genocide on April 6, 2004. Annex 2 of Study 1 drew on a report of the Human Rights Watch/Arms Project report (pp. 68-69) concerning five reported shipments of French arms into Goma, DRC, between May and June 2004 (all negotiated before the May 17, 1994 arms embargo, according to the Honorary French Consul). Study 2 referred to alleged French financing of an October 1990 GoR arms purchase from Egypt (p. 23 and footnote 24). When other Joint Evaluation Steering Committee Members voted for retention of these references, France withdrew from its membership in the Steering Committee and retracted its support for the Joint Evaluation. | |||
