4.3 Developments in the Anticipation, Detection and Prevention of Violent Conflict and Genocide

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Gregory Stanton, President of GenocideWatch, has identified eight stages of genocide. At each of these stages, preventive measures can stop the development of the next predictable stage. This section is concerned with the international response to genocide during the last four stages. The issues addressed include early warning; military intervention; and regional, sub-regional, and local approaches.

Early Warning
The Joint Evaluation recommended that a unit be established in the UN Secretary General’s Office to analyze the early warning information being generated by various elements in the UN system as well as outside institutions, such as research institutes. Specifically, Recommendation A-3 called for:

Establishment of a unit for strategic analysis of early warning of conflicts, including genocide and political assassination, directly under the Office of the Secretary-General, drawing on, but not substituting for, the information provided by UNHCHR, UN/DHA and a worldwide network of states, regional organizations, institutes and NGOs. This unit should have the capability to analyze, interpret and develop strategic options to be presented to the Secretary-General, but should not have other operational responsibilities. The head of this unit should have guaranteed direct access to the Secretary-General. The unit would not substitute for a Humanitarian Early Warning System

No such unit has been established though units have been established and/or strengthened in several UN entities concerned with humanitarian action, such as OCHA (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) and UNHCR (High Commissioner for Refugees). In 1995 an interdepartmental mechanisms was formed, the Inter-Departmental Framework for Coordination on Early Warning and Preventive Action (referred to as the Framework Team). The Framework Team has since grown from its original 3 members into a still semi-formal interagency mechanism involving 24 UN entities. However, one of the failings of the Framework Team noted by the Secretary General’s reports on conflict prevention has been a difficulty in translating its recommendations into concrete follow up actions.²⁷ OCHA has established the Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN – see para 5.11), which has been very successful in collecting and disseminating information on crises but was never intended to develop a scenario-building function which is so crucial for effective early warning .

Most early warning efforts fall short of the four-fold capacity called for by the Joint Evaluation, which are:

• Key Information collection
• Good analysis
• Scenario building
• Effective communication.

The element that is entirely missing in many early warning systems is scenario building.²⁸

According to one observer, the problem is not “Early Warning” in terms of information; it is “Early Awareness and Early Action.” Relevant systems of the international community are not set up to provide awareness on the basis of warning and action on the basis of awareness. One issue is the sovereignty barrier, and the idea of “Sovereignty as Responsibility” has not penetrated decision-making levels as yet. A notable example of the prevention problem is the Eritrean-Ethiopian war, which was “absolutely predictable,” given the disintegrating relations for the previous three years and the absence of a demarcated border.²⁹ There was no early awareness. Similarly, the need for a robust UN Military Observer Mission in the Congo (MONUC) is frequently noted; early warnings were present, and Security Council Members refused to take up their responsibilities.

Two recent developments could have a major impact on the capacity of the UN System to identify, analyze, and take actions on conflict and genocide information. On the tenth anniversary of the Rwanda genocide, April 7, 2004, the UN Secretary General announced his intention to appoint a Special Adviser on Genocide Prevention³⁰ In July, Juan Mendez was announced to fill this position. It will be important for the Special Advisor to have access to the Security Council as well as to the Secretary General. This implies that the position should have clear accountability to both entities. The Secretary General has also established a High Level Panel on “Threats, Challenges and Change.” The panel is examining policy and systemic issues in the UN system, as opposed to earlier efforts, e.g. the “Brahimi panel,” which focused on the existing policy framework.³¹ The High Level Panel is to submit its report by the end of 2004.

A strong case can be made for a Special Advisor to be complemented by a standing high-level panel that would command the respect of the Security Council as well as that of the Secretary General. This would be an independent group of internationally recognized persons of high moral stature, say, selected Nobel Peace prize recipients, served by a small expert staff, and reporting to the UNSG and to world leaders, who would give highest possible profile to emerging man-made humanitarian crises. The Special Advisor would be the Chair of the Panel.³²

The Joint Evaluation also stressed the importance of local and regional early warning capacity. The Inter-Governmental Group Against Drought (IGAD), with GDF and USAID support, has set up a system (CEWARN) to coordinate the early warning and conflict management systems of its member states in the Horn of Africa (CEWARUs). The office of CEWARN has just produced its first information analysis on the violent Karamoja cluster that crosses the borders of Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia. The model directly derives from Joint Evaluation recommendations.³³

In another potentially significant development, the Heads of State Members of the African Union declared at a Second Extraordinary Session, meeting in Libya in February 2004, a “Common African Defense and Security Policy.” The Policy confirmed a “Peace and Security Council” (established in Durban in 2002) to be its implementing mechanism. The Council would, among other things, serve as a “collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa” (Article IV- (b) – para.16). A pamphlet describing the proposed capacity is reportedly modeled on the centrality of state “secret” intelligence and a situation room for coordinating a military response, in contrast to the open, decentralized approach of the CEWARN system described above.³⁴

Military Intervention
The Joint Evaluation recommended that a Peacekeeping “Chapter 6.5” Mandate be promulgated, arguing that this would have given UNAMIR the mandate it lacked under Chapter VI of the UN Charter in Rwanda.³⁵ Recommendation A-2-b (and A-2-b-i) called for:

The rationale for the hybrid mandate is that under Chapter VI (Articles 33-38) of the UN Charter (the mandate under which UNAMIR was operating, in 1994) UNAMIR was only empowered to seek the resolution of conflict through peaceful means and at the request of the parties to any dispute. But under Chapter VII (Articles 39-51), on determining a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression,” the Security Council may authorize more robust measures to “restore international peace and security.” These measures can include coercive measures, such as economic sanctions and the use of military force. But other measures are to be exhausted first. Historically, the Security Council has been loath to use the Chapter VII mandate, partly owing to the difficulty of getting Member agreement on its use, and partly owing to the expense of more robust operations. The view of the Joint Evaluation was that a hybrid, “6.5” mandate could provide enough authority for a UN peacekeeping force to protect civilians, using force if necessary, but falling short of all the measures provided for in Chapter VII.³⁷

An external panel, convened by the Secretary General and led by former Swedish Prime Minister Invgar Carlsson, examined the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda (United Nations 1999).³⁸ The Panel Report made 14 recommendations that, in general, called for a more proactive and forceful role on the part of the UN, including the Secretary General and Security Council, in preventing genocide. A number of the panel’s recommendations echoed Joint Evaluation recommendations, including improving the capacity of the UN system for early warning, the flow of information on human rights issues, and peacekeeping operations.

A second, more sweeping, independent panel issued a report in 2000 on United Nations Peace Operations. The report of this Panel, led by Lahkdar Brahimi, popularly known as the “Brahimi Report,” makes 54 recommendations in 20 categories. Many of these recommendations find echoes in the Joint Evaluation but go into more detail in certain areas. For example, the Brahimi Report pays considerable attention to establishing and training civilian police that would be ready for deployment in peace operations. Detailed attention is also given to logistics and funding support, expenditure management, and information technology. Most of the report’s recommendations are directed to the UN Secretariat, but one recommendation (No. 19) calls for “substantially enhancing the field mission and preparation capacity of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights …”

The Joint Evaluation also recommended greater use by the UN and regional organizations of specially trained civil policemen and policewomen in complex emergencies (Recommendation A-2-b-iii). This recognized that combat soldiers were not needed in every situation and that civilian police could have been effective even in Rwanda. The Brahimi report took up this issue and pursued its operational implications. A more accessible pool of police in supplying countries is said to have been established.

No “6.5” mandate has been established. But some recent UN Peacekeeping Operations, including in Bosnia, Ituri-DRC (most recently) Timor Leste, Sierra Leone, and Liberia, have had a Chapter VII mandate. The adequacy with which these operations have been resourced has been mixed to poor. Many of the contingents were too few in number to cover all the eventualities that they faced. They have frequently had problems of communication (language as well as incompatible radio systems), have often lacked armor and firepower and encountered difficulties arising from different military doctrines between the contributing forces. The British intervention in Sierra Leone was in effect a rescue mission after several hundred poorly resourced UN peacekeepers had been taken hostage. MONUC is currently the most costly UN PKO, but many would argue that it is still too small and weak to do the job it is required to do (including protecting the citizens of Bukavu from a predatory faction supported by Rwanda). The best-resourced operations tend to be those where the UN Peacekeeping Force is combined with a unilateral contingent from one of the Perm-Five Members of the Security Council (Kosovo-U.S.-led coalition, Ituri-France, Timor Leste-Australia, Sierra Leone-UK). A rapid deployment capability is still a work in progress, even at the regional level, where the European Union (EU) has taken the most concrete steps.

Thus, while progress has not been uniform or comprehensive, UN Peacekeeping deployments have generally become more robust and been given stronger mandates during the last eight years. However, it would appear that Security Council Members remain generally reluctant to provide the mandates and rules of engagement necessary to enable UN Peacekeeping Forces to respond effectively to all the potential threats to them and civilians in their area of operation and troop contributing states do not always provide forces equipped sufficiently to enable them to engage in more forceful ways than self-defense.

Participation of Regional, Sub-Regional, and Local Organizations
The Joint Evaluation concluded that despite rhetoric emanating from the international community about greater reliance on regional and sub-regional organizations and the neighboring states individually, these were given neither the mandate nor the resources nor the actual cooperation at some critical stages in the Rwanda emergency. Consequently, the Joint Evaluation recommended (A-4) that the Secretaries General of the UN and regional organizations, such as the OAU and the OAS, along with member states,

• Ensure that regional participation in preventive diplomacy carries over into peacekeeping so as to establish continuity between mediation and peacekeeping.
• Allocate adequate resources to regional and sub-regional organizations and neighboring states to enable them to be effective in preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping, taking into consideration that most of the world’s conflicts occur in regions where these parties have the fewest resources to deal with them.
• Ensure that the UN sanctions action, sets parameters and monitors forceful intervention and, where needed, helps finance and otherwise support such actions, but remains the body of last resort for implementation.
• Accelerate current plans for strengthening OAU’s peacekeeping functions with the support of the UN.

The report of an independent panel commissioned by the OAU, Rwanda: the Preventable Genocide, took these recommendations seriously (OAU, 2001). The report was bitingly critical of the full panoply of members of the international community, including the OAU itself (see chapters 11 and 15 especially). The recommendations of the panel’s report (chapter 24) bear a close relationship to those of Joint Evaluation. The current assessment has not reviewed the precise extent to which the OAU panel recommendations have been adopted in its successor organization, the African Union (AU). But the AU has been a more visible presence in complex emergency-related events in sub-Saharan Africa in recent years, such as Burundi and Liberia.

But post-1996 experience shows that reliance on regional and sub-regional organizations is not a panacea. Their objectives vary and their memberships can overlap. For example some countries, such as the DRC, belong to two sub-regional organizations with overlapping objectives: The Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and the Communauté Economique des Etats d’Afrique Centrale (CEEAC). Some organizations are extremely weak in terms of administrative and managerial capacities.³⁹ Critical factors for the effectiveness of such organizations include the commitment of member countries as well as the commitment of donors to provide long-term support.

27. Membership of the Framework Team spans the peace and security, development and humanitarian assistance sectors but does not extend beyond the UN system (although "desk-to-desk" consultations now take place with the European Commission). Membership of the Framework Team includes: DDA, DESA, DPA, DPKO, FAO, ILO, OCHA, OHCHR, UNDP, UNESCO, UNHABITAT, UNICEF, UNHCR, UNIFEM, WFP and WHO. The World Bank, the IMF, DPI, OSAA (Office of the Special Adviser on Africa), UNEP, UNFPA, UNODC, and the Secretary-General's Executive Office participate on a case-by-case basis. (Personal communication from David Carden)

28. Personal communication from Howard Adelman.

29. Personal communication from I. William Zartman.

30. Two support positions are to be established in the Office of the Secretary General. A private Center on Genocide Prevention, to be located in New York and to undertake analyses that will also support the Special Adviser, is under discussion. Interview with Gregory Stanton, Executive Director of Genocide Watch, June 8, 2004.

31. Phone interview with Bruce D. Jones, May 28, 2004.

32. The Panel proposal was made in a personal communication from Robert J. Muscat.

33. The initial information from CEWARN is said to be dramatic (note from Howard Adelman). Sudan has also set up an early warning and conflict management office, but its nascent status is evident by its lack of warnings produced on the crisis in Darfur.

34. Observation by Howard Adelman, June 8, 2004.

35. In a comment of June 15, 2004, Linda Melvern cites a frequent observation of former UNAMIR Commander, Roméo Dallaire, that it is "not a question only of mandate but of means."

36. See the following section for further discussion of regional approaches.

37. A related issue is that there is no specific provision for peacekeeping forces as such in the UN Charter. This would provide another rationale for a "Chapter 6.5" provision. This suggests to one observer the need for a "6.75 provision" as well. Comment from I. William Zartman, June 15, 2004.

38. Other members of the panel were: Han Sung-Joo and Rufus M. Kupolati.

39. Personal communication from René Lemarchand.

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