Lessons from Rwanda - Lessons for Today

5.2 Progress in Improving Policy Coherence and Coordination

Foster Policy Coherence; Effective Coordination Among and By Official Agencies
As noted in Section 4.5 the Joint Evaluation addressed a number of recommendations to the UN Security Council, General Assembly and Secretariat with the objective of achieving greater policy coherence between inter alia the political, military and humanitarian functions and avoiding repetition of situations where humanitarian action became a substitutes for political action. Two points of particular relevance to the humanitarian sector noted in Section 4.5 are that:

the recommendation that a Humanitarian Sub-Committee of the UN Security Council be established has not been implemented
the innovation proposed by “the Brahimi Report” in 2000 of integrated missions in UN peacekeeping operations.

Inevitably such developments in relation to coherence overlap considerably with efforts to improve coordination and it is difficult to separately discuss the implications of the integrated mission model from developments in coordination.

The Joint Evaluation identified coordination as a particular problem during the humanitarian response during 1994 and offered three alternative options to the UN system and recommended the adoption of Option 3.

Option 1. Strengthen and extend existing inter-agency coordinating arrangements and mechanisms through such measures as inter-agency Memoranda of Understanding, improving the funding and central services functions of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs.

Option 2. Considerably strengthen the central coordinating role of UN/DHA by channeling all humanitarian assistance for UN agencies and their humanitarian partners through DHA, enabling it to determine the priorities and amount of funding to be received by each agency.

Option 3. Consolidate in a new, expertly led and -staffed and fully operational mechanism of the United Nations, the emergency response functions of the principal UN humanitarian agencies (UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF and DHA).

Though Option 3 was regarded as completely unrealistic and even ‘off the wall’ when the Joint Evaluation was published, it apparently came close to being recommended by Maurice Strong’s 1997 Renewing the United Nations: A Program for Reform commissioned by the incoming Secretary General Kofi Annan. According to Weiss (1998)⁵¹ a proposal to integrate the humanitarian components of different UN agencies under the leadership of one individual remained in the draft proposals until the penultimate draft when it was removed following representations by particular agencies.

The 1997 reforms resulted in the transformation of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) into the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The vision for OCHA was that it should be a leaner and more effective than DHA and closer to Secretary General. Its three core functions were to be emergency coordination, the development of humanitarian policies and the advocacy of humanitarian concerns to the political organs of the UN, principally the Security Council. The question of OCHA’s presence in the field was left vague (Tsui and Thant Myint-U 2004).

The reform package also included the creation of four Executive Committees covering the four principal sectoral areas of the UN: Peace and Security, Humanitarian Affairs, Economic and Social Affairs, and Development Operations, each with its own designated Convener. Inevitably there is overlap between the membership of the four Executive Committees⁵² For the first time the Executive Committees brought the relevant UN Departments and agencies together:

“to sharpen the contribution that each unit makes to the overall objectives of the Organization by reducing duplication of effort and facilitating greater complementarity and coherence. The Executive Committees are designed, therefore, as instruments of policy development, decision-making and management. The heads of United Nations entities consult with one another on work programs as well as other substantive and administrative matters of collective concern, to identify and exploit ways of pooling resources and services so as to maximize program impact and minimize administrative costs and more generally to facilitate joint strategic planning and decision-making.” Executive Committee on Economic and Social Affairs (EC-ESA) website⁵³.

Implicit within the conception of the Executive Committees on Peace and Security (ECPS) and the Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA) was that there could be common political and humanitarian strategies. As noted in Section 4.5 in 2000 the UN Panel on Peace Operations (‘the Brahimi Report’) introduced the notion of integrated missions which involved UN humanitarian operations being brought under the auspices of a peacekeeping operation under the direct authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary General and with the Humanitarian Coordinator usually being designated the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General. The “integrated mission” model has so far been used in Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, DRC, Afghanistan and Liberia.

The ‘search for coherence’ has been the focus of two research studies, the first conducted just before the publication of the Brahimi Report and the second over two years later. Both concluded in negative terms: “The integrationist interpretation of coherence has proved problematic in theory and in practice” (Macrae and Leader 2000) and “the search for coherence needs to be re-examined. … The humanitarian imperative of protecting and saving lives in conflict has taken a back seat in UN peace operations” (Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue 2003)⁵⁴Humanitarian NGOs operating in countries where the integrated mission model are becoming increasingly critical of the approach and expressing their concerns on the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (Schenkenberg 2004; ICVA 2004). Commenting on OCHA’s position one authoritative observer writes “OCHA cannot successfully protect the integrity of humanitarian action and at the same time embrace the coherence agenda of the UN system” and continues “Either .. the UN systems various mandates need to be changed or the international community needs to design new humanitarian structures that have greater independence from the prevailing political agenda (Minear 2004). Another experienced observer proposes that OCHA and OHCHR should be taken out of the ‘political UN’ and positioned closer to the ICRC and other ‘purist’ humanitarian entities such as Medecins Sans Frontieres (Donini 2004).

Commenting on the overall problematique of coherence Peter Walker offers the following observation:

“The problem is that we on the humanitarian side are arguing for our analysis to permeate and inform the political economic and military actions of governments when dealing with crises, but at the same time we are requiring that our actions remain independent, impartial and neutral. This is not a contradiction or a dilemma, it is just difficult to do, both to argue coherently and to do” (Walker 2004 – personal communication)

In addition to the creation of OCHA, the Executive Committees and the integrated mission model there have been several other significant developments in relation to coordination in the humanitarian sector. One such has been the strengthening of the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP).⁵⁵ Donor frustration with unprioritized ‘shopping lists’ submitted by UN agencies that showed little sign of coordination or harmonization gradually led to the adoption of mechanisms and procedures within the CAP process to improve coordination and prioritization of activities. A key innovation has been the preparation of Consolidated Humanitarian Action Plans (CHAP) by the various UN agencies and their partners at the field level which feed into the CAP document. Increasingly other humanitarian actors including the Red Cross and NGOs have included their plans within the overall CAP and in some instances donors have encouraged coordination by insisting that only those proposals included in a CAP will be considered for their funding (Bassiouni 2001; Donini 2004) However, in some contexts the CAP remains far from the central coordination tool it is intended to be. A recent study in Burundi for instance estimated that the CAP represented only one-tenth of the total aid funds provided to the country signaling that many donor organizations and NGOs function outside the CAP framework (Bijojote and Bugnion 2004).

Since 1996 there has been an extraordinary increase in the availability of information on different emergency operations. Reliefweb, a project managed by OCHA was launched in 1996 and has become the central gateway to documents and other sources of information related to humanitarian relief and assistance⁵⁶. With teams in New York, Geneva and Kobe, Japan it currently provides a 24-hour coverage of relief, preparedness and prevention activities for both complex emergencies and natural disasters worldwide and is used by donors, agencies and interested members of the public.It currently receives approximately one million ‘hits’ each day.

The UN Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) which forms part of OCHA grew out of operations in the Great Lakes during and following 1994. Using e-mail and web technology to deliver and receive information from remote and poorly developed areas of Africa it combined use of national and local news and media services with agency press releases, reports and its own interviews with key actors. It is funded by contributions from donor organizations. From its initial area of operation in the Great Lakes and East Africa, IRIN has extended its coverage to West Africa and southern Africa and more recently to Central Asia and Iraq. It is highly valued not just by agency personnel but by researchers and journalists as it has significantly increased their access to information.

Since the Kosovo Operation many of the large, high profile humanitarian operations have benefited from Humanitarian Information Centers (HIC) which gather, collate and disseminate information relevant to the overall operation. HICs make significant use of mapping software to present the information of web-based and email systems. Though organizationally part of OCHA, HICs are operated as ‘common framework’ coordination support and information sharing services to humanitarian agencies (whether UN, NGO or government). HICs have now been implemented in seven operational contexts (Kosovo, Eritrea, Afghanistan, Occupied Palestinian Territories, Iraq, Liberia and Darfur).

While the IT revolution would have substantially increased the availability of information over the period since 1996, these three OCHA-managed projects, Relifeweb, IRIN and HICs have made an impressive contribution to the amount, accessibility and timeliness of the information now available. While improved information facilitates, though does not by itself guarantee, improved coordination, these projects have significantly improved the ability of humanitarian actors to coordinate their activities.

Another development in the organizational architecture aimed at improving coordination has been the increased role and profile of the Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and its various working groups.⁵⁷Policies and improved working procedures for humanitarian agencies have been produced on the CAP, gender, transition and post-conflict reintegration staff security, field coordination procedures, the use of military and civil defense assets, HIV/AIDs and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). The IASC has significantly contributed to the use of the framework approach and inter-agency collaboration, particularly among the UN humanitarian agencies. Currently the IASC is seeking to extend this model of working together to field operations.

So what effect have all these developments in procedures and mechanism had on actual operational coordination? A recent external review of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (Jones and Stoddard 2003) concluded:

“These tools are significantly more developed than they were five years ago. There is evidence that field level coordination has improved, at least among the UN system of agencies and with a sub-set of the major international NGOs.” However it also found “much less evidence of progress on solving perennial problems of mandate gaps, capacity gaps, or system-wide problems. In handling such issues as the ‘transition from relief-to-development’, IDPs, the military-humanitarian interface, etc,”

ALNAP’s annual reviews of evaluations of humanitarian programs frequently identify coordination as one of the weakest areas of the interventions evaluated, though good coordination practice does exist in a number of different operations and sectors (e.g. ALNAP 2002). Factors contributing to poor coordination include competition for funding and profile (by UN agencies as well as NGOs and other actors); pressures on agencies to be present and active in every high profile operation contributing to the presence of such large numbers of organizations in some operations that effective coordination becomes almost impossible; lack of clarity in the mandates and roles of key organization coupled with a willingness by some organizations to move out of their traditional mandates and areas of greatest competence in response to pressing unmet needs or by availability of funding; the quality and personalities of key individuals in the coordination structures and managing the field teams of key agencies.

Though somewhat caricatured the following quote captures these different pressures and approaches:

“In the field, political, humanitarian, development, protection, human rights and solidarity objectives – and their respective institutions – splash and overlap as in a Rorschach test. For better of for worse, mandate creep and forward flight into operational activism seem to be the names of the game. In Afghanistan, the ICRC runs agricultural programs; solidarity NGOs vie for public contracts; the military do “humanitarian” work dressed as civvies with weapons at the ready; UN humanitarian agencies carry out development; UN development agencies focus on relief; UN political and humanitarian entities carry out human rights work; UNHCR seeks development projects in order to raise money for protection; and NGOs act as donor mouthpieces, vice versa. Meanwhile, donors, UN and NGO coordination bodies try to make sense of it all, while everybody speeds around in white vehicles – to the consternation of the locals and their leadership.” (Donini 2004)

A potentially significant recent development has been the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative. Recognition of the critical role of bilateral and multilateral donors in the functioning of the humanitarian sector and their limited direct participation in other accountability and performance enhancing initiatives in the sector led to a Conference in Stockholm in January 2003 at which 23 statements of Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship were endorsed. These establish general principles and principles of good practice in funding, promoting standards and enhancing implementation, and learning and accountability. Currently donor performance against these principles is being examined in two selected test cases – both of which are in the Great Lakes region – Burundi and DRC.⁵⁸

51. Weiss Thomas (1998) ‘Humanitarian Shell Games: Whither UN Reform?’ Security Dialogue 29, no 1 (March).

52. The Executive Committee for Peace and Security (ECPS) is Chaired by the Department for Political Affairs (DPA) and its membership includes the Departments for Disarmament Affairs (DDA), Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Public Information (DPI), and Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OCHCR), the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the World Bank, the UN Security Coordinator, the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) and the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict OSRSG/CAC. The Executive Committee for Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA) is Chaired by OCHA and shares nine members in common with ECPS (DPA, DPKO, DPI, OHCHR, OSRSG/CAC, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF. The five members it does not share with ECPS are: the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO); the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD); the UN Environment Programme (UNEP); the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palistinian Refugees (UNRWA); the UN World Food Programme (WFP) and the World Health Organisation (WHO).

53. http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/ecesa/ecesa.htm

54. In an as yet unpublished case study for the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue synthesis report, the researcher concluded that that the attempt to achieve coherence in the DRC had contributed to a weak humanitarian response to the massive needs. Other contributing factors included: the interpretation of the ‘Do No Harm’ approach by OCHA and other humanitarian agencies; their prioritisation of peace-building strategies over the direct provision of humanitarian assistance; poor security that limited access to large areas and the considerable logistical difficulties of operating in the DRC (Stockton 2003).

55. Introduced in 1991 as part of the General Assembly Resolution 46/182 that created the Department of Humanitarian Affairs the use of the CAP mechanism grew rapidly to become the norm by the mid-1990s.

56. www.reliefweb.int

57. The IASC was established in June 1992 in response to General Assembly Resolution 46/182. The IASC provides a forum that brings together as its Full Members the principal UN humanitarian agencies (OCHA, UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, WHO, UNFPA, FAO) and as Standing Invitees the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the ICRC and IFRC, three NGO coordinating bodies/umbrella organizations (ICVA, SCHR, InterAction) and the World Bank, the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General on Internally Displaced Persons and the Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights. The primary role of the IASC is "to formulate humanitarian policy to ensure coordinated and effective humanitarian response to both complex emergency and to natural disasters" www.humanitarianinfo.org.iasc

58. http://www.reliefweb.int/ghd/

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