5.3 Progress in the Management of Relief

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Policy and Funding for Preparedness Measures
The Joint Evaluation made two recommendations on Preparedness and Contingency Measures. The first was that all agencies and donors should “develop policy guidelines and operating procedures appropriate to their functions for undertaking needs and capacities assessments, contingency planning, preparedness measures and procurement of supplies and equipment for cost-effective interventions, as well as for cost-effective investments in mitigating critical logistical bottlenecks”. The second was addressed specifically to donors and agencies funding implementing partners that they should “be prepared to provide increased up-front funding to agencies for contingency planning and preparedness measures for major complex emergencies and honor pledges to do so” and develop “a common understanding regarding mutually acceptable levels of investment in contingency planning and preparedness measures and accompanying levels of risk.”

The OECD/DAC prepared a paper on the subject in 1997.⁵⁹ It concluded that while significant improvements had been made in preparedness during the 1990’s, the efforts were often fragmented and isolated and that the key problem was the unwillingness of agencies and governments to establish a systematic and forceful link between information gathering, the analysis of information and the planning of the response. It made a number of recommendations including encouraging a concentration of expertise and capacity among a few lead actors. Two years later a study by the Center on International Cooperation of approaches to preparedness in UNHCR, Oxfam, and IRC proposed a three-pronged approach of building preparedness capacity; removing obstacles to rapid response; and facilitating collaboration in the field⁶⁰.

There have been a number of initiatives and the development of mechanisms over the last few years in this field. One initiative has been the International Humanitarian Partnership (IHP – comprising the UK, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland and the Netherlands) with the objective of providing tailor-made, mobile and flexible, rapidly deployable support modules in support of UN missions. The UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination Teams (UNDAC) and the Humanitarian Information Centers (HICs – operated as a common service to the humanitarian sector by OCHA) have been important beneficiaries of the IHP emergency support modules to date. The rapid movement of Albanian Kosovars to Albania and Macedonia in 1999 exposed severe weaknesses in UNHCR’s preparedness and response measures. Since then the agency has put significant efforts into improving its preparedness and response through the Emergency Security Management Initiative. Under this system potential countries are graded (1-3) in terms of their assessed risks of requiring UNHCR involvement and each grading carrying with it certain automatic preparedness steps such as readying standby partners,⁶¹ pre-positioning stocks, identifying funds and establishing inter-agency links. Increasingly, the larger agencies are participating in joint contingency planning exercises

Where large scale, high profile operations are anticipated – e.g. Afghanistan and Iraq – it appears that UN agencies, key NGOs and donors collaborated well in contingency planning and preparedness, though in neither case did the anticipated levels of population movements materialize.⁶² However, the system functions much less well in relation to lower profile, under-resourced contexts. According to one interlocutor the translation of contingency plans into practical operational plans is often a weak aspect of contingency planning in the humanitarian sector.

Refugee Camp Security
The Joint Evaluation highlighted the sharp challenges posed by the presence in the refugee camps in Tanzania and particularly in Zaire of ex-Far soldiers, Hutu militias, political leaders in the Habyarimana regime and those who had participated in the genocide. Despite requests by the UN Secretary General for the establishment of a force to separate the armed elements and non-bona fide individuals from the genuine refugees, only one country had offered troops and the force was never assembled. The presence of the armed elements and the location of the camps so close to Rwanda’s borders represented a very real threat to Rwanda’s security as well as to the safety and protection of the refugees themselves and to the surrounding populations, particularly in eastern Zaire where there were already pre-existing tensions between the Congolese population and the Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge who had long been settled in the area. Despite the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention clearly stating “for reasons of security, countries of asylum shall, as far as possible, settle refugees at a reasonable distance from the frontier of their country of origin”⁶³ both the Government of Zaire and international donors were reluctant to undertake the costly relocation of the camps.

As shown in Chapter 2 the failure by the international community to deal with the refugee issue during 1995-96 resulted in the RPA intervening in Zaire/DRC in support of the AFDL uprising of October 1996 and to the RCD/MLC uprising of August 1998. The former intervention killed tens of thousands of innocent refugees as AFDL/RPA forces pursued the ex-FAR and Hutu militias deep into Zaire and resulted in the deposition of President Mobutu and his replacement by Laurant Kabila. The second intervention precipitated the first pan-African war involving eight foreign national armies confronting each other on DRC territory and caused or contributed to at least 3 million excess deaths over the period 1998-2003. Despite the killing of many of the ex-FAR and Hutu militia combatants and the demobilization and repatriation to Rwanda of substantial numbers by MONUC since 2002, the continuing presence of a number of Rwandan combatants in eastern DRC continues to be used as a pretext by Rwanda in seeking to influence the course of the peace process and the work of the Transitional Government in eastern DRC. The consequences of the international community’s failure to deal with the security issues in the refugee camps in 1995-96 have had profound consequences for the entire region and millions of people.

The Joint Evaluation recommended that UN peace missions be given the authority and the means to ensure the protection of camp populations and aid workers, working where appropriate in coordination with host governments, and in disarming camp residents, separating genuine refugees from those not entitled to refugee status, preventing military training of camp residents and expelling hostile leadership from the camps and splitting up large camps into smaller ones at a greater distance from the border. In addition it recommended that official and non-governmental agency staffs should be advised on prudent patterns of behavior to minimize security problems.

The UN Secretary General’s 1998 ‘Report on the Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa’ gave impetus to discussion of the issue by the Security Council and UN agencies. UNHCR developed the concept of a ‘ladder of options’ for ensuring ‘the security and civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps and settlements’, ranging from preventive measures and cooperation with law-enforcement authorities in the host countries, through the deployment of civilian or police monitors to the deployment of a UN peacekeeping or other type of regional or multinational force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Operationalizing the ‘ladder of options’ has involved the creation of new posts in UNHCR at the HQ level and in the field in the form of Humanitarian Security Officers and the development of a closer working relationship with DPKO.

Where the local police force is capable and the security threats are not great UNHCR has evolved a ‘security package’ approach. This began in 1998 with a ‘security package’ arrangement with the Tanzanian Police annually providing approximately USD1.5 million worth of assistance towards the costs of deploying police in the camps, constructing new police posts, providing training and contributions to the cost of vehicles, bicycles and radios (Crisp 2001). The overall success of the ‘security package’ approach in Tanzania has resulted in its replication elsewhere, though with modifications to address the needs of the local context. In Guinea for instance a worsening security situation in and around the Liberian refugee camps in 2000 resulted in the relocation of the camps further back from the border, the deployment of a ‘mixed force’ of local police and gendarmerie. However because of the lower capability of the local police force officers seconded from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police were seconded to provide training and supervisory support.

In the more challenging context of armed ex-combatants among the refugees much depends on the capacities available locally to achieve the necessary disarmament and separation of the ex-combatants from the bona fide refugees. In DRC in 2001 the presence and active cooperation of MONUC soldiers enabled the successful separation of a group of soldiers and their families (1,200 people in all), from a larger group of approximately 25,000 refugees who had fled the Central African Republic after a coup attempt. (Yu 2002). However, camp security remains a critical issue in other parts of the Great Lakes as illustrated by the killing of 160 Congolese refugees in a UN transit camp at Gatumba near Bujumbura in August 2004.

Recognition of the need to develop a closer working relationship between UNHCR and the ‘peace and security’ pillar of the UN led to a process beginning in 2002 that includes staff exchanges and agreed areas and modes of collaboration including design of the mission and mandates of peacekeeping operations and Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement (DDRRR). In April 2004 the Under-Secretary General of DPKO and the High Commissioner for Refugees jointly addressed their staff with the agreed areas of cooperation. Such developments represent progress. However, it remains to be seen whether a repeat of the extremely challenging situation that faced UNHCR, DPKO and the Security Council in eastern Zaire in the 1994-96 period would be met with a more meaningful and vigorous response. Increased awareness of the costs of not dealing effectively with the issue of armed elements in the refugee camps ought to, but cannot be guaranteed to, produce robust and effective interventions.

Though we do not have sufficient information to make an objective overall assessment of practices in relation to the location of refugee camps in relation to international borders, there does appear to be a greater appreciation of the issue and a greater preparedness to meet the additional costs involved in relocating camps away from the borders of conflict-affected, refugee-generating countries. The relocation of Liberian refugees in Guinea further back from the border with Liberia in 2000 noted above significantly improved their security. In Chad in December 2003 UNHCR took the difficult and costly decision to relocate Darfurian refugees in settlements strung along the border area to new camps well back into Chad. This decision was in response to cross-border attacks on the settlements by Janjaweed militia but was also influenced by the suspicion that some of the refugees were regularly crossing back into Darfur to fight with the rebels of the Sudan Liberation Army and the Justice and Equality Movement. By September 2004 118,000 refugees had been relocated to the new camps.⁶⁴ However, in other operations it seems that the combination of host government reluctance to allocate necessary land and the high costs involved of establishing the new infrastructure required by new, planned camps often deter camp relocation even where it is acknowledged to be desirable.

Development of an Integrated Humanitarian Early Warning System
In addition to a recommendation which called for the establishment of a unit for the strategic analysis of early warning of conflicts and genocide within office of the UN Secretary General (see Section 4.3), the Joint Evaluation also recommended establishment of an Integrated Early Warning Cell within the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (now OCHA) to provide warning of population displacements and sudden increases in relief needs. OCHA has established an Early Warning Unit which forms part of the ‘Framework Team’ within the UN system (the Inter-Departmental Framework for Coordination on Early Warning and Preventive Action noted in Section 4.3). Responsibility for warning of population displacements is shared between agencies and those with a presence on the ground (which might include UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF or OCHA,) feeding the information into the Framework Team and into either the response or contingency planning processes.

As noted earlier in relation to contingency planning (para 5.21) UNHCR has significantly improved its early warning and contingency planning procedures (the Emergency Security Management Initiative – ESMI) following a critical evaluation of its early warning and contingency planning mechanisms during the 1999 Kosovo crisis. A network of external analysts and country specialists produces a monthly update of “Hot Spot” countries and their likelihood of generating significant population displacements. This assessment links the identified countries to three levels of organizational preparation with pre-positioning measures taking place as part of the ‘amber’ stage and preparation of Emergency Response Team deployments and ‘Standby Partners⁶⁵’ as part of the ‘red’ stages.⁶⁶ Though welcome such developments do not appear to address those situations where population displacements build-up in areas where UN staff and potential observers are not present – as in north-west Rwanda during the three weeks preceding the July 1994 refugee influx into Goma. The lack of UN personnel on the ground in Darfur during critical stages of 2003 and early 2004 are understood to have limited the warning of new influxes available to UNHCR teams working in Chad.

Systematically Assess Comparative Cost-Effectiveness of Use of Military Contingents in Humanitarian Relief Operations
The JEEAR recommended that a study be undertaken to compare the cost-effectiveness of military and civilian channels for the provision of humanitarian assistance. The study was undertaken by the OECD/DAC in 1998⁶⁷ It concluded that “Civilian assets are, in general, more cost-effective. Military means, which are designed to be fail-safe rather than efficient, will cost more task-by task than civilian means”.

The JEEAR did not make any recommendations regarding civil-military cooperation.

Professional NGO Performance and Ensuring Accountability
‘Professional NGO Performance’ and ‘Ensuring Accountability’ were the subjects of separate recommendations by the Joint Evaluation and are considered jointly here because of their close relationship.

To achieve more professional NGO performance the Joint Evaluation recommended that the Red Cross/NGO Code of Conduct and “A set of standards being developed by several NGO networks that is intended to supplement the Code of Conduct” (i.e. what subsequently came to be known as the Sphere Project) … “be widely disseminated and promoted among NGOs, official agencies and governments”. This recommendation was complemented by a recommendation addressed to NGOs, the Red Cross, the UN IASC and donor organizations and member states that proposed two optional routes by which compliance with the Codes and standards could be achieved:

• Option 1. Self-managed regulation. Under this option, NGO networks would be assisted in acquiring greater capacity to monitor member compliance with the Code and standards.
• Option 2. An international accreditation system. Under this option, core criteria for accreditation would be developed jointly by official agencies and NGOs.

The Joint Evaluation recommended use of an accreditation system.

To achieve improved accountability within the humanitarian sector the Joint Evaluation offered a choice of three options68 while recommending the third. The first option involved simply the implementation of other recommendations on agency coordination; standards of NGO conduct and a commitment to the Red Cross/NGO Code of Conduct as, taken together, these would achieve some improvements in accountability. A more radical proposal was that a unit be established within UN/DHA that would:

• undertake regular field-level monitoring and evaluation of emergency humanitarian assistance, and review adequacy of standards followed;
• serve as an ombudsman to which any party can express a concern related to provision of assistance or security;
• set up and manage on behalf of the international community a database on emergency humanitarian assistance operations; and
• prepare periodic status reports for the public domain.

If this recommendation were not regarded as feasible an alternative proposal was to “identify a respected, independent organization or network of organizations to act on behalf of beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance and member states to perform the functions described in Option 2 above.” It was this final option that was recommended by the Study 3 team.

Since 1996 the Humanitarian Sector has undertaken a range of initiatives aimed at improving performance and accountability within the sector. The principal initiatives have been the Sphere Project, the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP), People in Aid and the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership-International,.

Discussions about developing performance standards within the humanitarian sector were already underway within the NGO sector by 1995 and the Joint Evaluation gave encouragement to the development of these standards. Fundraising for an initiative by the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR) and the US NGO umbrella InterAction took place after the publication of the Joint Evaluation and the project, titled the Sphere Project commenced in 1997. Through an inclusive process (involving over 4000 organizations in 80 countries) standards were developed in each of five key sectors (water supply and sanitation, nutrition, food aid, shelter and health services). In addition a Humanitarian Charter was developed that brought together the elements of the Red Cross/NGO Code of Conduct and the key provisions of international humanitarian law, human rights law and refugee law. A trial Handbook was published in 1998 and the first Sphere Handbook was published in 2000. Following reviews of experience in using the handbook and extensive dissemination activities a revised Handbook was published in 2004. Though criticized from some quarters for its use of the notion of “minimum” standards rather than “benchmarks”, the difficulty of setting standards that would apply to different geographical and cultural contexts and its emphasis on the assistance elements rather than the protection elements of humanitarianism, the Sphere Standards have been widely translated and adopted around the world. A recent evaluation of the Sphere Project noted “it is clear that there is a widespread perception that it has had a beneficial effect” (Van Dyke and Waldman 2004). A study by Buchanan-Smith showed how the Joint Evaluation’s recommendations on professional NGO performance and improving accountability had simultaneously encouraged and pressured NGOs to develop the Sphere Project (Buchanan-Smith 2003).

The concept of ALNAP developed during a presentation of Joint Evaluation Study 3 to a meeting of European and Nordic bilateral donors in Copenhagen in 1996. The network was launched in 1997 to provide an international, interagency forum working to improve learning, accountability and quality across the Humanitarian Sector. It currently has 50 Full Members and over 350 Observers Members bringing together bilateral and multilateral donors, UN agencies and departments, NGOs, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement with the Full Members drawn from a mix of policy, operations, evaluation and monitoring sections of their organizations. During its first years it focused upon encouraging greater use of evaluation in the humanitarian sector and undertook a range of initiatives aimed at improving the quality and use made of such evaluations. In part due to ALNAP’s activities, evaluations of humanitarian programs are now routine within the sector and their quality has improved.

People In Aid is an international network of development and humanitarian assistance agencies working to improve human resource management and support. It was formed in 1999 out of an earlier inter-agency working group that had undertaken a critical survey of human resource management in the sector and the development of a code of best practice for human resource management – the People in Aid Code of Best Practice. The Code comprises seven principles: health, safety and security; learning, training and development; recruitment and selection; consultation and communication; support, management and leadership; staff policies and practices; and human resources strategy. People in Aid has over 50 member agencies.

One year after publication of the Joint Evaluation a group of UK NGOs formed the Humanitarian Ombudsman Project. At an international conference in Geneva in March 2000 to review the findings of the Ombudsman project, it was recognized that an international Humanitarian Ombudsman was not be the best approach possible to tackle accountability problems. Thus the humanitarian accountability project was born to identify, test and recommend a variety of accountability approaches and mechanisms. During the period 2000-2003 through a process of consultation, research and negotiation a framework and approach was developed that resulted in 2003 in the creation of the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership-International (HAP-I). The objective of HAP-I is to make humanitarian action accountable to its intended beneficiaries through the use of both the self-regulation and accreditation methods that were posited as alternative approaches by the Joint Evaluation. Members of HAP-I (currently 16 agencies) seek to comply with seven “Principles of Accountability” in the belief that the design and implementation of their humanitarian work will be strengthened, and that as a consequence, confidence in, and support for them will also be enhanced.

In addition to these principal initiatives the humanitarian sector has also seen a dramatic increase in the provision of training courses by dedicated training providers such as RedR and BioForce Développement, by universities, by civil defense organizations and humanitarian agencies. The training section of Reliefweb lists nearly 100 organizations providing training on various aspects of humanitarian action.

Despite the impressive range of initiatives in the humanitarian sector in the period since 1996 it is interesting to reflect back on those recommendations of the Joint Evaluation that have not been implemented or come to fruition. The Red Cross/NGO Code of Conduct gained a wide sign up by organizations within the humanitarian sector but it is a voluntary, self-policing code and compliance mechanisms envisaged by the Joint Evaluation have not developed. Though national-level groupings of NGOs (such as the UK’s Disasters Emergency Committee) use the Code to sanction members if need be, as yet an international association of humanitarian NGOs possessing the authority to sanction its members has not formed. Though the Ombudsman concept was actively considered by UK NGOs a different model and approach was adopted in the subsequent development of HAP-International. Neither DHA or its successor OCHA, have given serious consideration to establishing an Ombudsman for the humanitarian sector. While independent evaluations and ALNAP’s synthesizing of such evaluations in its Annual Reviews goes some way to addressing the notion of ‘third-party’ monitoring and placing status reports in the public domain, this recommendation has not developed as envisaged by those involved in Study 3 of the Joint Evaluation.

Have these initiatives resulted in improved NGO performance and accountability? Of the principal initiatives described above only the Sphere Project has yet been the subject of an evaluation, which was broadly positive (Van Dyke and Waldman 2004). Despite the advent of the ALNAP Annual Reviews in 2001 and their synthesis of the results of evaluations of humanitarian action, the evidence base for making generalized statements about trends in performance in the humanitarian sector remain surprisingly patchy. Notwithstanding these observations, in the opinion of our interlocutors, there have been significant improvements in performance over the past decade.

Minimize Adverse Local Impacts
The Joint Evaluation found that the huge refugee camps in Tanzania and Eastern Zaire had had significant negative environmental impacts on areas around the camps and that support to communities in the hosting areas by UNHCR, UNDP and other agencies had been inadequate. Among the recommendations to minimize and mitigate adverse impacts of refugee populations on surrounding populations and their environments were that standard operating policies and procedures be prepared, that food commodities that minimize cooking requirements and fuelwood use would be provided and that other assistance to hosting communities would be extended.

Since 1996 a number of steps have been taken to address these issues. Revisions to the Memoranda of Understanding between UNHCR and UNICEF in 1996 and between UNHCR and UNDP in 1997 specifically mentioned consideration of the needs of local communities in refugee hosting areas in the design of programs. The 1997 revision to the MOU between UNHCR and WFP specifically mentions the need to minimize the environmental impacts in choosing commodities and the fuel sources most likely to be used. UNHCR’s 2003 ‘Framework for Durable Solutions for Refugees and Persons of Concern’ includes programs for Development Assistance to Refugees and Development through Local Integration that include the goals of sustainable improvements in conditions for host communities as well as refugees. UNHCR has also developed comprehensive guidance on environmental management in refugee operations (UNHCR 1998) and has a dedicated unit in HQ. The most the most recent version of the UNHCR Handbook for Emergencies (UNHCR 2000 b) repeatedly refers to the need to consider the needs of the local populations and host communities. However, studies of the impact of refugee operations on host communities continue to tell a story of negative impacts on certain sections within the host communities, often the poorest least able to adapt, that are not offset by the economic opportunities and improved access to certain types of services resulting from the refugee operation (Whitaker 1999). In the arid, resource scarce context of Chad, a recent UNHCR Real Time Evaluation notes the development of resource conflicts between the Darfurian refugees and local Chadians and the need for these to be addressed by the response program if such conflicts are not to worsen (Bartsch and Belgacem 2004).

Equitable Food Distribution
The Joint Evaluation found that the use of commune leaders as an expedient mechanism for food distribution in the huge camps in Tanzania and Eastern Zaire had resulted in rations being diverted from refugee consumption and reinforced the power of the commune leaders and of the Hutu militia present in the camps. It recommended the use of distribution systems providing rations directly to the household level. In the majority of refugee camps food is now distributed direct to households using ration cards⁶⁹. However, in the early days of large-scale refugee influxes where formal registration has not yet been undertaken, UNHCR and its implementing partners have little choice but to make use of the group leadership within the refugees to organize initial distributions.

Assess the Roles of the Media
The role of the media in the development and coverage of armed conflicts and genocide was discussed in Section 4.6. The media also play a critical role in relation to the humanitarian response.

Due to the important role of private funding for NGOs the amount of media coverage of a particular humanitarian crisis can have a substantial impact on the amount of private funding that is available. So called “forgotten emergencies” that receive little or no coverage in international press and television will receive only limited funding from private sources and agencies involved in the response will be heavily reliant on the levels of funding provided from official sources. In contrast, humanitarian crises that receive high and sustained levels of coverage (such as the Kosovo crisis in 1999) are also likely to receive high levels of private funding. While this dynamic is understandable in relation to private funding, the same dynamic is also evident though to a lesser extent in relation to official sources. Increased media coverage of a humanitarian crisis generally leads to increased funding from official sources as bilateral donor organizations and their ministers come under pressure from their respective public and parliaments and then from journalists “to do more”. Such pressures are undoubtedly heightened by the involvement of troops from that country in the peace enforcement or peacekeeping operations associated with that humanitarian crisis. With the two dynamics (private and public funding) operating in the same direction high and sustained media coverage can produce exaggerated levels of assistance in some contexts, contrasting with totally inadequate levels of funding in other contexts that have not been visited by international television crews and where ‘the story’ has not caught the attention of press and TV editors.

A study by Oxfam (2000) found that in response to the 1999 UN appeal for Kosovo and the rest of former Yugoslavia, donor governments gave USD 207 for every person in need. Those suffering in Sierra Leone received USD16 a head, and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, little over USD 8. It concluded “the reality that Oxfam sees in disasters around the world [is] that, despite their own tenacious efforts, people suffer because not enough aid is given to those emergencies beyond the media spotlight, or outside the areas of interest to the main Western governments.” Addressing or at least reducing such enormous discrepancies in levels of resourcing is one of the objectives of the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative.

Television coverage of the international response to humanitarian emergencies is often restricted to news programs that tend to give profile to the situation when dramatic footage is available but drop it once “the story” is judged to have “been covered” by editors and/or dramatic footage is unavailable. Because of the costs of deploying international TV crews and the competition between news organizations the resources available are rarely adequate to sustain coverage for more than a few days and so TV crews may spend only a few days in the area before being deployed to cover another story in another country. A concern with providing a connection between the viewing audience and the international assistance and staff involved frequently results in interviews with expatriate staff even when they comprise only a tiny percentage of the personnel involved in a response. (Benthall 1993; SCF/ECHO 1998; Ross 2004)

59. OECD/DAC (1997) ‘Preparedness in the International Humanitarian System: A Policy Review of Contingency Planning, Funding and Preparedness in Relation to Complex Emergencies’

60. Center for International Cooperation (1999) ‘The Preparedness Challenge in Humanitarian Assistance’ NYU.

61. Current standby partners include SRSA – Swedish Rescue and Safety Agency; DRC – Danish Refugee Council; RedR; THW – German Civil Defence; and NCA – Norwegian Church Aid.

62. UNHCR is currently drawing on the contingency stocks propositioned in the Gulf in 2002-2003 for use in Darfur.

63. Article II (6) of the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa.

64. http://www.unhcr.org/ ‘Darfur/Chad Emergency’ site 7/9/04.

65. Standby arrangements to provide emergency response capacity have been agreed with a number of different organisations including the Swedish Rescue and Safety Agency, Danish Refugee Council, RedR, Norwegian Church Aid and THW – German Civil Defence.

66. UNHCR 2004 Emergency Preparedness ad Response Paper presented to the 29th meeting of the Standing Committee EC/54/SC/CRP.4 and Geoff Wordley Personal Communication.

67. OECD/DAC (1998) Civilian and Military Means of Providing and Supporting Humanitarian Assistance During Conflict: Comparative Advantages and Costs Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation Report No 1. Paris:OECD/DAC.

68. The practice of offering options within certain recommendations was requested by the Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation following the presentation of single recommendations only at the draft stage.

69. Stephen Green, WFP, personal communication.

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