8. Findings and Conclusions: An Overall Assessment of the Impact and Influence of the Joint Evaluation

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Most interlocutors interviewed by the authors knew of the Joint Evaluation. Moreover, they saw the Joint Evaluation as pioneering in the following ways:

• It was the first report to be published that assessed the performance of the international community in all phases of the genocide. As one interlocutor put it, “The speed with which the Joint Evaluation was done was important. Simply in being there first to push a serious consideration of what happened pushed others to undertake a serious self-examination. Without the Joint Evaluation, I doubt there would have been the UN or OAU studies.”¹⁰⁵
• A sentiment expressed by several interlocutors was that the Joint Evaluation had “put the issues on the table as they were seen by evaluators and researchers commissioned by a collective of donor, multilateral, UN and non-governmental organizations and that this had legitimized and facilitated subsequent inquiries and investigations.” One informant stressed the inclusion of policy issues by the Joint Evaluation as being important and unique.
• Informants noted that the Joint Evaluation was the only review of the Rwanda genocide that assessed in the same analysis all elements of the involved international community: the United Nations system, regional organizations, Member States, bilateral donors and the international financial institutions, international NGOs, and the media. One interlocutor noted: “Covering all stakeholders was just not in the schema of some folks. The Joint Evaluation set a good precedent in this respect.”
• Another factor cited was the governance of the Joint Evaluation, the fact that its relatively large Steering Committee was representative of the same elements as those to whom the evaluation was addressed. This combination of large numbers and the form of governance gave the evaluation, according to our interlocutors, political weight and “voice.”¹⁰⁶ For another observer, the fact that the Steering Committee was multi-donor in character was significant and encouraged greater candor in the reports than might otherwise have been the case (Forman and Patrick 2000:60).
• Last but not least, our informants said that the fact the Joint Evaluation was a serious effort in terms of quality was also important. While it is difficult to trace the impact from one specific recommendation, the weight of all the Joint Evaluation recommendations taken together was important in the view of one interlocutor.

One of the most extensive (and complimentary) references in the literature to the Joint Evaluation is excerpted below:

A factor limiting the attention paid to the Joint Evaluation and its potential impact in the view of several interlocutors was its mode of dissemination and that a commercial publishing house was not secured. Another factor cited by a key informant as potentially limiting dissemination was the lack of a strategy for lead authors to publish articles emanating from the Joint Evaluation in a series of journals. Another factor may be that the printing of the Joint Evaluation in French was relatively limited, at 1,000 copies.
But there is clear evidence in the literature and from key informants that the Joint Evaluation stimulated further research and analysis of complex emergencies and the tendency toward genocide. It has also been used widely as a teaching resource at the college and university levels.

Not the least of the impacts traceable to the Joint Evaluation is the impetus it gave analytical and evaluation capacities in humanitarian assistance organizations, including the formation of ALNAP. Offsetting these impacts is the fact that those charged with analysis and evaluation still tend to be isolated from those charged with policy and program development, especially in official development agencies.

The impact and influence of the Joint Evaluation on policy reports prepared for key organizations like the UN, bilateral donors, and international financial institutions is mixed. The Joint Evaluation had a major direct impact on the OAU Panel Report and on an evaluation of World Bank experience with post-conflict reconstruction, but no discernible influence on the UN Panel Report on Peace Operations (the “Brahimi” Report). In other instances, the influence of the Joint Evaluation was indirect but discernable, as in the case of background papers that fed into such reports as the Responsibility to Protect and the OECD/DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace, and Development Cooperation.

One factor, but perhaps not the only one, was simply whether the staff preparing such reports was aware of Joint Evaluation. As noted previously, the Project Manager for one major report had not been aware of the Joint Evaluation. Yet, in spite of this, there is substantial overlap between the findings and recommendations of the two reports.¹⁰⁷

The critical question is whether reports and policy prescriptions, explicitly attributed to the Joint Evaluation or not, get translated into practice. In the humanitarian sector there have been clear and positive developments in relation to accountability, standards and greater professionalism. The understanding of the different elements and steps required to achieve stability after a period of conflict has improved considerably as witnessed by some successful Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement (DDRRR) programs. Though they do not meet all the requirements for an effective early warning system, the development of the work of organizations such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the International Crisis Group has greatly increased the availability of information and detailed analysis of the situation in many unstable areas of the world. However on the central issue of the prevention and suppression of genocide and massive human rights abuses the views of interlocutors and the literature together with our own assessments of the two cases of DRC and Darfur are on balance pessimistic. Whilst the international community has shown itself able to use military force to confront groups undertaking massive human rights abuses in Kosovo and arguably East Timor it would appear that for many countries in Africa massive public interest mobilization campaigns will be required to put sufficient pressure on decision makers in key countries to get action on an issue like genocide prevention and intervention.¹⁰⁸ The successful global campaign against landmines comes to mind.

The current outlook is particularly grim because the lead power, the U.S., is not likely to commit resources to another crisis, partly since it is stretched thin by the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Particularly if the crisis is remote and is not seen to constitute a strategic threat to the “great powers.” In this context the outlook for Darfur looks very dire, not to mention the Eastern Congo (DRC).¹⁰⁹

When giving testimony to a US Congressional Committee shortly after the 10th anniversary of the genocide in Rwanda, the author of the influential book ‘A Problem From Hell’ aptly stated:

One potentially bright spot in this bleak picture are the efforts mainly in Africa and Europe to mobilize the capacity to intervene relatively quickly in crisis situations. The AU and some countries have shown their capability to establish a military presence in Burundi. Darfur is a tougher problem politically and militarily. Neither African countries nor the AU have shown any appetite for intervening so far. But perhaps a “willing coalition” of African, European and other countries would provide the needed combination for an effective peacekeeping effort.

Great Lakes Issues
Issues producing continuing violence and human rights violations are far from resolved in the Great Lakes Region of Africa, even in Burundi and Rwanda, notwithstanding the Peace Agreement in Burundi and almost ten years of “peace” in Rwanda, not to mention the continuing insecurity in Eastern DRC. Recommendation F-2 of the Joint Evaluation called for, among other things:

• A sustainable, long-term solution to the cycles of civil and ethnic violence must involve the people and be a regional one. The countries of the Great Lakes Region must take the lead in developing this solution. But strong support from bilateral and multilateral development agencies and international NGOs is also essential.
• A carefully planned major donor conference to marshal external support.

A regional conference is planned for November 2004 in Dar es Salaam. This provides the countries of the region and the international community an opportunity to address development, political, and humanitarian issues that are still critical. This opportunity deserves the most serious attention by all parties. Another opportunity may not present itself when conditions are as propitious as they are now. There are important lessons contained in the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda that will be still be relevant to the objectives of the upcoming conference.

Three Proposals
Our extensive review of the literature and interactions with our interlocutors and Advisory Panel have encouraged us to offer three proposals that appear exceptionally pertinent and worthwhile.

The Determination of Genocide and a Nobel Panel on Genocide to support the new Special Adviser to the Secretary General
Had more timely and strategic information been brought to the UN Security Council, meaningful actions might have been taken before it was too late in both Rwanda and Darfur. In 1993-94 there was no mechanism for the various bits of information suggesting planning for genocide to be analyzed and brought to the attention of the Secretary General and the Security Council. Our report recommended that such a unit be established in the Secretary General’s Office. No such measure was taken over the following eight years, but at the time of the 10th Anniversary of the Rwandan Genocide in April 2004, the UN Secretary General announced the creation of a Special Adviser on Genocide Prevention and the incumbent, Mr. Juan Mendez was announced in July.

The new Special Adviser could theoretically play a key role. But he will need adequate budget and staff, neither of which seems assured at this point. It is important that he and his staff have the capacity and the mandate to undertake the determination as to whether or not a genocide according to the 1948 Convention is actually taking place in a particular context. Confusion over what it takes before the term ‘genocide’ can legitimately be used and the current practice of carefully treading around the term until one or more members of the Security Council choose to make their own pronouncement is wholly unsatisfactory. The determination function needs to be independent of those who will be obligated to respond if the occurrence of genocide is actually determined. Moreover it needs to be authoritative and soundly based.

It therefore seems essential to us that the Special Adviser and the Secretary General be supported by a highly respected external panel composed of, for example, three to five Nobel Peace Laureates (from around the world). This “Nobel Panel on Genocide” would help ensure that reports of the Special Advisor and Secretary General are made public and that when it is decided on the basis of the evidence available that a genocide is actually taking place that at least someone close to the Security Council has the mandate and the courage to use the ‘G’ word and ensure that “names are named and shamed” – both among the perpetrators and the key members of the international community.

An Evaluation of the International Response to the Conflict and Humanitarian Crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo
The loss of over 3 million lives in the eastern DRC as a result of the conflict that began in 1998 stands as a specter on the ability of the current institutions and instruments of the international community to mitigate international conflicts and their humanitarian effects. Given the enormity of what has happened in eastern DRC and the seriousness of the accusations being leveled at the international community, the UN and the humanitarian sector generally, the DRC case deserves to be subjected to an evaluation as thorough, transparent and wide ranging as the Joint Evaluation.

A Humanitarian Sub-Committee for the Security Council
The Joint Evaluation strongly recommended the establishment of a Humanitarian Sub-Committee of the Security Council, in order to ensure that the Council was fully informed of the humanitarian dimensions in countries experiencing complex emergencies. In part the recommendation was intended to provide a channel for humanitarian agencies, particularly NGOs with their strong grass roots bases and well-informed perspective on the situation at the field level, to inform the Security Council of the humanitarian situation ‘on the ground’. NGOs operating in Rwanda had credible information as early as 1993 about plans for genocide, but they had no entrée with the Security Council. Similarly, NGOs had specific information over a year ago about killings, massive population displacement, and the parties involved in Darfur.

In part also the recommendation was intended to reduce the likelihood of humanitarian assistance being used as a substitute for resolute political, and if necessary military, action. In its deliberations during the Rwanda crisis the Security Council had focused upon political and security aspects; humanitarian aspects and the implications of any decisions for the humanitarian agencies working on the ground, were not properly considered. Though the Humanitarian Coordinator does now provide briefings to the Security Council, the Sub-Committee recommendation was never seriously considered, let alone implemented.

During the course of this assessment members of the Advisory Group and key informants indicated that they continued to find merit in the Sub-Committee proposal. In addition to the original reasons there is the current, widely held-concern (noted in Sections 4.5 and 5.2) that since the ‘Brahimi’ Report in 2000 and the advent of the Integrated Mission model, that humanitarian considerations are regularly being “forced into the back seat” in UN peacekeeping missions. In addition the Darfur case shows once again that when faced with resistance to strategies designed to address fundamental security and protection issues in a country, the Security Council will tend to allow (or even actively push) for improved humanitarian access and view this as some form of substitute for more vigorous action to address the fundamental security and protection issues. A Humanitarian Sub-Committee would give the Humanitarian community a stronger voice in the political milieu of the Security Council and mitigate the continuing tendency for the community to be treated as an “instrument” of whatever policy thrust the Council, or key members of it, are pursuing.

105. Interview May 19, 2004.

106. Interview, May 24, 2004.

107. Prior to the interview by one of the authors with this Project Manager, he scanned the Joint Evaluation recommendations and found about 30 recommendations and findings that closely parallel those of the other report.

108. Samantha Power argues that such an approach is necessary (Power 2004).

109. For a sharply-argued view along these lines, see the previously cited papers by Thomas Weiss, "The Responsibility to Protect: Is Anyone Interested in Humanitarian Intervention?" and "The Sunset of Humanitarian Intervention? The Responsibility to Protect in a Unipolar Era." Op. cit.

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