Annex III: Summary Reviews of the Official Inquiries into the 1994 Rwandan Genocide conducted by the Belgian Senate, the French National Assembly, the UN and the OAU

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Belgian Senate ‘Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry Regarding the Events in Rwanda’ December 1997.

The Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry was established in April 1997 and delivered a detailed and hard-hitting report in December 1997¹¹⁰. The Commission was made up of 15 MPs led by Phillipe Mahoux and Guy Verhofstadt¹¹¹. It heard the testimonies of 95 witnesses – mostly Belgian ministers, diplomats, and members of the military and was allowed to consult all relevant official documents in the Foreign Affairs and Defense Ministries, including all correspondence between Kigali and Brussels. Members of the Commission visited Rwanda for one week.

The origins of the Commission are of some interest. The surfacing of the 11th January 1994 cable during 1995¹¹² and an article in the Belgian press in late 1995 about the warnings that had been available ahead of the genocide, led to a call for a Parliamentary Inquiry by two MPs, one of whom (Alain Destexhe) had been Secretary General of MSF International during the period 1991-95. Following an initial rejection of their call by the ruling party, a public campaign was launched to press for an Inquiry. The campaign was supported by families of the ten paratroopers who had been killed. Over 200,000 signatures were collected and a public opinion survey found that 70% supported an Inquiry. After some brinkmanship over an unrelated vote in the Parliament the Gov-ern-ment agreed to the formation of a group of four MPs the so-called ‘Rwanda Ad Hoc Group’ to investigate the issues¹¹³. The group began work in August and submitted a report in December 1996. In view of the amount of material and the importance of the issues the Ad Hoc Group proposed the formation of a larger Special Commission on Rwanda. The establishment of the Commission was delayed by legal issues over its status and access to secret documentation. It was therefore decided to establish the Commission with the status of a formal Parliamentary Board of Inquiry.

In its report submitted in December 1997, the Commission noted some of the limitations it had encountered in undertaking its work. One limitation was that it had not able to interview General Dallaire or any other UN officials due to the refusal by the UN Secretary General Secretary (Kofi Annan) to authorize UN officials to testify before the Board¹¹⁴. In addition the Commission undertook its work at the same time as a legal investigation was underway into possible criminal negligence by the Officer in Charge of the Belgian contingent (Luc Marchal) when the ten Belgian paratroopers had been disarmed and murdered. To respect the separation between the two processes the Commission did not call certain potential witnesses and respected the right of silence of certain other witnesses.

The report focused in considerable detail on what it identified as the 17 principal ‘failures, errors and responsibilities’:

• Shortcoming on the UN Security Council’s decision-making process in establishing UNAMIR
• Shortcoming in Belgium’s decision to participate in UNAMIR
• 'The lack of effective technical preparation of the Belgian contingent in UNAMIR
• The deficient performance of the UN Secretariat and DPKO during the mission
• The deficient performance of the Belgian Army’s General Staff and the Operations Centre established at the Evere Army Headquarters during the operation
• The absence of an on-site information service and effective analytical capacity [within UNAMIR]
• The failure to provide protection to the informant ‘Jean-Pierre’ who was the source of General Dallaire’s cable of 11th January 1994
• The deficient co-ordination between the Department of National Defense and the General Staff of the Belgian Army
• The deficient monitoring of the Rwanda Dossier by the Belgian Council of Ministers and the Departments of National Defense and Foreign Affairs
• The weakness of diplomatic efforts aimed at reinforcing UNAMIR’s mandate
• The incorrect assessment of the situation and passive attitude on 7th April 1994 of the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative in Rwanda and High Ranking UNAMIR Officers
• Lapses in the reception and accompaniment of the families of the ten paratroopers
• The unilateral decision to withdraw Belgian troops from UNAMIR
• The absence of an effective reaction against RTLM (Radio Television Milles Collines)
• Interference by unofficial political channels and intermediaries¹¹⁵
• The biased handling of the Rwanda Dossier by the Belgian military authorities
• The presence of Rwandan refugees in Belgium and the possibility of protection in the handling of legal dossiers

Where the Commission felt it appropriate, responsibility for these ‘failure and errors’ were apportioned to governments, organizations and individuals. In doing so the Commission frequently employed direct language. For instance, on the issues of ‘lapses’ identified in decisions by the Security Council when deciding to deploy UNAMIR the report states:

The Commission was very critical of the refusal by DPKO to approve General Dallaire’s 11th January request to undertake searches for arms caches in the Kigali area. It saw such ‘passiveness’ as rendering UNAMIR "less and less credible in the eyes of Rwandans which consequently gave the impressions that they could impede UNAMIR’s work with impunity". The Commission identified numerous "lapses" within the UN Secretariat and Security Council and concluded that:

"the United Nations’ organizational structure, in particular with regard to peacekeeping missions, the Security Council , the general secretariat, led at that time by Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, and the DPKO, which was led at that time by Mr. Kofi Annan, bear responsibility for these lapses".

"The Commission believes that in the critical moments of the Rwanda crisis, the following people did not react to the events in an effective manner and ,in some cases, did not act professionally" and named SRSG Booh Booh, General Dallaire and three officers in the Belgian UNAMIR contingent.

The report made a total of 55 recommendations. Whilst the majority of the recommendations were addressed to the Belgian military, several were addressed to the UN and other countries. One called for parliaments of "each of the countries that, in one way or another, was involved in the events in Rwanda, as well as the United Nations, to carry out an in-depth analysis and assessment of what happened". Another recommendation called for the inclusion within domestic Belgian law of provisions to enable the punishment of crimes against humanity and in particular the crime of genocide.¹¹⁶

French National Assembly ‘Mission of Information on the military operations undertaken by France, other countries and the UN in Rwanda between 1990 to 1994’ "The Quiles Commission" December 1998¹¹⁷

In March 1998, three months after publication of the Belgian Senate’s Commission of Inquiry, the French National Assembly established a ‘Mission of Information’. The Mission of Information was undertaken by the two standing parliamentary commissions on Defense and Foreign Affairs and was headed by Paul Quiles, a Socialist Senator. The ‘Mission’ met 45 times and heard 88 civil and military witnesses – academics, high ranking military officers, governmental and parliamentary members, and diplomats. The rapporteurs of the Mission also met with UN officials in New York, with US officials in Washington, and with representatives of the Belgium Government, Parliament and Commission of Inquiry. They also traveled to Rwanda, though only briefly. The Mission had access to classified documents, some of which were included in the annexes of the final report.

The concept of a ‘Mission of Information’ is weaker than that of an ‘Inquiry’ or ‘Investigation’ by the National Assembly. The concept was imposed by Senator Quiles and did not respond to calls by other political parties at that time, notably the Greens and Communists, for a more formal Inquiry. The Mission saw its role as contributing to an objective, evidence-based debate and discussion and in particular to elucidate the mechanisms and motivations behind the three French military interventions in Rwanda during the period 1990-94¹¹⁸. Its role was not to establish individual or collective responsibilities but to analyze what had happened during the various French military operations in Rwanda and extract general conclusions and recommendations. The mission did not carry any sanctioning power. Practically, it also meant that witnesses did not have to give testimony under oath, and that some witnesses were heard in closed sessions.

The report was presented on December 1998. It ran to over 1,200 pages in length¹¹⁹. The main conclusion of the Mission was that successive Governments in Paris had made ''errors of judgment and strategy,'' but it absolved France of any responsibility for the killings. France was found to be guilty by omission rather than by commission and had not been an "accomplice" in the Rwanda genocide.

This overall conclusion was seen by some French and foreign media as amounting to a whitewash. However, a number of observers have also pointed out that the Mission did highlight a large number of structural and institutional problems with the way French policies in Rwanda were conceived and implemented. In particular:

1. France was trapped by its own strategy and manipulated by the Hutu-led Rwandan government.
2. French military support to Rwanda was too heavy,
3. France significantly increased its arms transfers to Rwanda at a time when the Rwanda army was weak and disorganized and more or less unable to fight;
4. Operation Noroît did not aim solely at protecting French nationals working in Rwanda but was also intended to ensure that the Habyarimana regime remained in place.
5. French military personnel involved in Operation Noro’t¹²⁰ conducted operations that were extremely close to the front line with the RPF
   
   ''If France did not participate in battle, nevertheless on the ground it was extremely close to the Rwandan armed forces. It continuously participated in the working out of battle plans, provided advice to the general staff and to sector commanders, proposing redeployments and new tactics. It sent advisers to instruct the Rwandan armed forces in the operation of advanced weapons. It taught mining and ambush techniques, suggesting the most appropriate emplacements.¹²¹''
   
   
6. The "logic" of French military support to the Rwandese government before and immediately after the genocide consisted in preserving some degree of political and diplomatic capacity to negotiate, in view of the fact that the RFP was certain of a military victory.
7. French pressures on Habyarimana to democratize the regime remained very weak, especially when compared with the extent of French military support.

Among its other findings were that:

• There had been no US plot with the objective of supplanting French influence in Rwanda
• Accusations that French forces trained and supported the Hutu militia were untrue
• Reports that arms had been supplied to the FAR in the period after the Arms embargo introduced as part of the Arusha Accords and indeed after the 6th April in via both Kigali and to the FAR elements in Goma after the end of the conflict were unsubstantiated
• Operation Turquoise had not actively assisted members of the Interim Government who had played leading roles in the genocide to leave Rwanda and seek sanctuary in Zaire.
• There had been a three day delay in troops of Operation Turquoise locating and providing protection to a group of many thousands of Tutsi at Bisesero near Lake Kivu, during which time they had been attacked and thousands killed. However the delay in the provision of protection by the French forces had not been intentional

The Mission made six broad recommendations:

1. Increase/strengthen the transparency and coherence of international crisis management;
2. Improve French parliamentary control over military operations conducted outside the national territory
3. Strengthen the reform of French cooperation with African states
4. Contribute effectively to African Security¹²²
5. Improve the effectiveness of UN peace keeping and peace making operations
6. Establish an International Criminal Court

Ten years after the genocide, on the occasion of the Anniversary, a number of French political parties and organizations (e.g. the Green party, the Communist party, the International Federation of Human Rights) requested a Commission of Inquiry whose main purpose would be to determine French responsibilities and possibly individual responsibilities.¹²³

In addition a group of French NGOs and other groups have organized a ‘Citizens Inquiry’ into the genocide¹²⁴. The NGOs behind the initiative include Survie, Cimade, and others. Their preliminary conclusions are extensive and clearly attack the Mission of Information conclusions and its head Paul Quiles personally. In its preliminary conclusions, the citizen inquiry goes back to accusations that have been made in the past, bringing new evidence. These key accusations are related to questions badly or inadequately addressed by the Parliament Mission of Information, including:

1. French military presence at check points where Tutsi were killed in front of them,
2. Training of the FAR, many of whom were or became militia members,
3. Events regarding the massacre at Bisesero;
4. Assisting perpetrators to escape Rwanda towards Goma, including Théoneste Bagosora, Jean-Baptiste Gatete, and others
5. Important violation of the arms embargo after the genocide
6. Continued diplomatic relations with perpetrators of genocide

‘Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda’ December 1999 ‘The Carlsson Report’¹²⁵

In March 1999, 27 months after his inauguration as UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan informed the Security Council of his intention to appoint an independent inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the genocide. The initiative was supported by the Security Council. In May, the Secretary-General appointed Ingvar Carlsson (former Prime Minister of Sweden), Professor Han Sung-Joo (former Foreign Minister of the Republic of Korea) and Lieutenant-General Rufus M Kupolati (rtd.) (Nigeria) to conduct the inquiry.

The Inquiry was mandated to establish the facts related to the response of the United Nations as a whole to the genocide in Rwanda, covering the period October 1993 to July 1994, and to make recommendations to the Secretary-General. The task of the Inquiry thus included studying the actions of UNAMIR, the Secretary-General and the Secretariat, as well as the Member States of the organization and the political organs in which they are represented. With respect to actions of Member States, the Inquiry focused on positions taken which affected the response of the United Nations to the tragedy and noted that: "It will be the task of other bodies to analyze the broader issues raised by individual countries' positions on the Rwandan issue".

The Inquiry was given access to all UN documents and studied files in the central UN archives, those maintained by the different departments in the Secretariat and the UNAMIR archives. It interviewed over 100 individuals in the US, Europe, Rwanda and other countries in the Great Lakes region. Those interviewed included Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Kofi Annan, General Dallaire, Alain Destexhe (Belgian Senate Inquiry) Paul Quiles (French National Assembly Mission of Information), Presidents Bizimungu of Rwanda and Museveni of Uganda and former South African President Nelson Mandela. The Inquiry team also met with survivors of the genocide in Rwanda, Belgium and the US, the families of the ten Belgian paratroopers, representatives of NGOs in Rwanda and academics and experts on Rwanda including Howard Adelman the co-leader of Study II of the Joint Evaluation.

The Inquiry team’s report was presented in December 1999. At 85 pages long it was considerably shorter than the Belgian Commission of Inquiry, the French Mission of Information and the OAU report that was published 7 months later in July 2000. It did not reference its specific sources of information whether documentary or through interview and it is therefore less transparent in its method than the other studies. Nevertheless the language used is clear and direct and the responsibilities for particular mistakes and failings are indicated.

The report focussed on nine ‘key events’ that were identified as follows:

• Arusha Peace Agreement
• Establishment of UNAMIR
• 11th January cable
• Crash of the Presidential plane
• Withdrawal of the Belgian contingent
• Continued role of UNAMIR
• New proposals on the mandate of UNAMIR
• Establishment of UNAMIR II
• Operation Turquoise

The overall conclusions of the Inquiry were damning and are captured in the following two paragraphs:

The report made a total of 14 recommendations that were summarized as follows

1. The Secretary-General should initiate an action plan to prevent genocide involving the whole UN system.
2. Renewed efforts should be made to improve the capacity of the UN in the field of peacekeeping, including the availability of resources. … In each peacekeeping operation it should be clear which Rules of Engagement apply.
3. The United Nations – and in particular the Security Council and troop contributing countries – must be prepared to act to prevent acts of genocide or gross violations of human rights wherever they may take place. The political will to act should not be subject to different standards.
4. The early warning capacity of the United Nations needs to be improved, through better cooperation with outside actors including NGOs and academics, as well as within the Secretariat.
5. Efforts need to be made to improve the protection of civilians in conflict situations.
6. Further improvements in the security of UN and associated personnel, including local staff, are necessary. Consideration should be given to changing existing rules to enable the evacuation of national staff from crisis areas.
7. Cooperation between officials responsible for the security of different categories of staff in the field needs to be ensured.
8. An effective flow of information needs to be ensured within the UN system.
9. Further improvements should be made in the flow of information to the Security Council.
10. The flow of information on human rights issues should be improved.
11. National evacuation operations must be coordinated with UN missions on the ground.
12. Further study should be given to the possibility to suspend participation of the representative of a Member State on the Security Council in exceptional circumstances such as the crisis in Rwanda.
13. The international community should support efforts in Rwanda to rebuild the society after the genocide, paying particular attention to the need for reconstruction, reconciliation and respect for human rights, and bearing in mind the different needs of survivors, returning refugees and other groups affected by the genocide.
14. The United Nations should acknowledge its part of the responsibility for not having done enough to prevent or stop the genocide in Rwanda. The Secretary-General should actively seek ways to launch a new beginning in the relationship between the United Nations and Rwanda.

‘Rwanda the Preventable Genocide: The Report of the International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events’ July 2000

In early 1998 the OAU approved the establishment of an International Panel of Eminent Personalities (IPEP) to investigate the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. This was first time in the history of the OAU that one of its commission that’s would be completely independent of its creators in its findings and its recommendations.

The Panel’s mandate was broader in scope than any of the other three Inquiries/Mis-sions: A key section of its TOR states, "The Panel is expected to investigate the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the surrounding events in the Great Lakes Region...as part of efforts aimed at averting and preventing further wide scale conflicts in the... Region. It is therefore expected to establish the facts about how such a grievous crime was conceived, planned and, executed; to look at the failure to enforce the Genocide Convention in Rwanda and in the Great Lakes Region; and to recommend measures aimed at redressing the consequences of the genocide and at preventing any possible recurrence of such a crime.

The Panel had seven members:

• Sir Quett Ketumile Joni Masire; Chairman, Former President of Botswana
• General Ahmadou Toumani Touré; Former Head of State of Mali
• Lisbet Palme; Chairperson of the Swedish Committee for UNICEF, Expert on the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child
• Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf; Former Liberian Government Minister, Former Executive Director of the Regional Bureau for Africa of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP)
• Justice P.N. Bhagwati; Former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of India
• Senator Hocine Djoudi; Former Algerian Ambassador to France and UNESCO, Permanent Representative to the UN
• Ambassador Stephen Lewis; Former Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Canada to the UN, former Deputy Executive Director of UNICEF

It held its first meeting in October 1998 and delivered its 290 page report 30 months later in July 2000¹²⁶. It met with 270 people in 10 countries "representing every facet of this tragedy: academics; United Nations officials; representatives of Rwandan, neighboring, and several other governments; survivors; accused perpetrators; refugees; and human rights groups". The Panel commissioned studies where they felt there were gaps in the available literature and was supported by, or received contributions from, 21 academics and specialist scholars including two of the Team Leaders from the Joint Evaluation (Lennart Wohlgemuth and Howard Adelman). In terms of its scope, time taken to complete its work and the numbers of people interviewed the OAU report was the most comprehensive of the four Inquiries/Missions¹²⁷ and arguably shared much in common with the scope and intent of the Joint Evaluation published over four years earlier and from which it frequently cites.

The language of the Panel’s report was forthright, sometimes passionate and supported in considerable detail with over 1,000 endnotes. Unlike the other reports, it examined for instance the political situation in Rwanda, the plight of women and children in Rwanda and the first and second wars in the DRC. Few of the actors escape the Panel’s criticism, including the OAU. A sample of some of the criticisms are provided below:

The Panel made 31 recommendations relating to Rwanda, the Great Lakes Region and Africa as a whole, the OAU, the International Community and, alone among all the Inquiry/Mission reports, on the Genocide Convention itself.

On Rwanda the Panel urged:

The Panel also placed the issue of the payment of reparations before the international community:

On the Genocide Convention the Panel called for:

Reactions to the report were varied. President Kagame reportedly stated that "Where the investigation has remained within the mandate and terms of reference given by the OAU, the report has been relevant, informative and shows originality in its investigation". However he criticized the parts of the report which he regarded "outside the mandate and terms of reference". Here, he mainly focuses on the "theory of a double genocide". It was felt "unreasonable" that Gerard Prunier and Filip Reyntjens had been quoted throughout the report. "The Government of Rwanda has reservations about the report's over-reliance on the biased and revisionist literature of Gerard Prunier who has recently not only revised his book and his views on the genocide, but also revised the facts without further research to fit his newly acquired revisionist ideology, stance and solidarity with the perpetrators of the genocide".¹²⁸

110. The full report was nearly 700 pages in length and contained just under 1500 endnotes and references to sources. The full report (in French) is available at http://www.senate.be/www/?MIval=/publications/viewPub.html and an English translation of the findings and recommendations is available at http://www.senate.be/english/rwanda.html

111. Subsequently, in July 1999, Mr. Verhofstadt became Prime Minister of Belgium.

112. It is believed (but cannot be proven) that the Joint Evaluation was responsible for the first circulation of this document and its entering the public domain.

113. http://destexhe.be/commission_parlementaire_rwanda.htm

114. For a period in early 1997 it was hoped that the Commission would be able to conduct an indirect interview wit General Dallaire via an intermediary (Astri Suhrke, co-author of Study II of the Joint Evaluation). However even this arrangement was not authorized by the Secretary General.

115. This refers to attempts by certain Rwandan politicians to reduce the support for the Arusha Accords by the Belgian Government (that were unsuccessful) and links between certain Belgian political parties and the Rwandan Government prior to the genocide.

116. This recommendation led to the so called ‘Belgian Genocide Law’ being introduced that allowed foreigners, including heads of state, to be tried in Belgian courts for war crimes and crimes against humanity. In 2003 however after cases were brought against Ariel Sharon and Colin Powell the Belgian parliament voted to restrict the scope of the law.

117. This account of the Mission of Information is based on a background paper prepared by Agnes Callamard who was one of the contributors to Study II of the Joint Evaluation.

118. The three operations were: Operation Noroît which provided military support and training to the FAR during the period following the RPF invasion of northern Rwanda in October 1990 until just after the signing of the Arusha Accords in August 1993; Operation Amaryllis which evacuated French and other nationals and members of the President Habyarimana’s family and Government over a three day period in April 1994; and Operation Turquoise in the west of the country during July and August 1994.

119. http://www.assemblee-nat.fr/dossiers/rwanda.asp

120. The number of French troops participating in Operation Noroit varied from168 to 700.

121. New York Times translation

122. Relations with former French colonies, particularly those in Africa had traditionally been largely managed by the Elysée Palace with limited parliamentary control.

123. International Federation of Human Rights 7/04/2004 ‘Lettre ouverte à M. Jacques Chirac, Président de la République française’ http//www.fidh.org/article.php 3?id_article=858

124. ‘Commission d'enquête citoyenne sur le rôle de la France durant le génocide des Tutsi au Rwanda en 1994’ http://www.survie-france.org/article.php3?id_article=393

125. http://www.un.org/News/ossg/rwanda_report.htm or alternatively http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/documents/RwandaReport5.htm

126. The report is available at http://www.aegistrust.org/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=92&Ite-mid=123 or at http://www.visiontv.ca/RememberRwanda/Report.pdf The document was not published commercially, which in retrospect is regrettable given its importance and comprehensiveness.

127. The team had significantly more time to undertake its work than the three other Inquiries/Missions which took between 7 and 9 months to complete their work.

128. Africa Online 24th August 2000 "Rwandan government protests against new report on the genocide" http://www.afrol.com/News/rwa004_report_genocide.htm